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An information system (IS) risk assessment is an important part of any successful 
security management strategy.  Risk assessments help organizations to identify mission-
critical IS assets and prioritize risk mitigation efforts.  Many risk assessment 
methodologies, however, are complex and can only be completed successfully by highly 
qualified and experienced security experts.  Small-sized organizations, including small-
sized colleges and universities, due to their financial constraints and lack of IS security 
expertise, are challenged to conduct a risk assessment.  Therefore, most small-sized 
colleges and universities do not perform IS risk assessments, which leaves the 
institution’s data vulnerable to security incursions.  The negative consequences of a 
security breach at these institutions can include a decline in the institution’s reputation, 
loss of financial revenue, and exposure to lawsuits.  
 
The goal of this research is to address the challenge of conducting IS risk assessments in 
small-sized colleges and universities by validating the use of the Operationally Critical 
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Allegro risk assessment 
methodology at a small-sized university.  OCTAVE Allegro is a streamlined risk 
assessment method created by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering 
Institute.  OCTAVE Allegro has the ability to provide robust risk assessment results, with 
a relatively small investment in time and resources, even for those organizations that do 
not have extensive risk management expertise.  
 
The successful use of OCTAVE Allegro was validated using a case study that 
documented the process and outcome of conducting a risk assessment at George Fox 
University (GFU), a small-sized, private university located in Newberg, Oregon.  GFU 
has the typical constraints of other small-sized universities; it has a relatively small 
information technology staff with limited expertise in conducting IS risk assessments and 
lacks a dedicated IS risk manager.  Nevertheless, OCTAVE Allegro was relatively easy 
for GFU staff to understand, provided GFU with the ability to document the security 
requirements of their IS assets, helped to identify and evaluate IS security concerns, and 
provided an objective way to prioritize IS security projects. Thus, this research validates 
that OCTAVE Allegro is an appropriate and effective IS risk assessment method for 
small-sized colleges and universities.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
An information system (IS) risk assessment is the formal process that enables IS risks 
to be identified and mitigated (Ghernaouti-Helie, Tashi, & Simms, 2011; Liu, Kuhn, & 
Rossman, 2009; Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2009).  The risk assessment is designed to 
identify IS assets and to provide vulnerability and threat descriptions, an approach for 
classifying risks, and a risk mitigation plan (Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2009; Syalim, 
Hori, & Sakurai, 2009).  Numerous methods for performing risk assessments are 
available, including the Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology [NIST], 2012); Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (COBIT); the Specification for Information Security Management 
Systems (as defined by International Organization for Standardization/International 
Electrotechnical Commission [ISO/IEC] 27005); and the Operationally Critical Threat, 
Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE; Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011; 
Liu et al., 2009). 
An IS risk assessment is an important component of a comprehensive security plan for 
any entity, including institutions of higher education (Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Liu et al., 
2009; NIST Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative [JTF], 2011).  According to 
Blustain, Chinniah, Newcomb, Plympton, and Walsh (in press), it is vitally important for 
post-secondary academic institutions to conduct risk assessments to safeguard their 
institutional data.  Blustain, Chinniah et al. (in press) noted that, to establish priorities for 
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mitigating IS risks, a comprehensive security plan for an academic institution should 
identify areas that contain the greatest vulnerabilities.  Kvavik (2006), in a classic study 
on the security of Information Technology (IT) in higher education, also noted that post-
secondary institutions of all sizes should perform regular IS risk assessments as part of 
their risk management plans.   
According to the classic study on small organizations by Beachboard et al. (2008), 
validating an appropriate risk assessment methodology for small-sized institutions of 
higher education has been difficult because many of the current methodologies are 
complicated.  Beachboard et al. noted that commercially developed risk analysis tools, 
such as RiskWatch®, are expensive and complex and, thus, may result in data quality 
issues and unreliable risk assessment outcomes.  Beachboard et al. also recognized the 
difficulties encountered by small organizations in applying various non-commercial risk 
methodologies, such as Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process (FRAAP), the 
older OCTAVE-S, as discussed below, and NIST’s Guide for Conducting Risk 
Assessments (2012).  According to Beranek (2011), it is not feasible to apply IS security 
management methods developed mainly for larger institutions directly to small- and 
medium-sized organizations.   
OCTAVE Allegro is a popular risk assessment methodology developed in 2007 by 
researchers at the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI), as discussed in the report by Caralli, Stevens, Young, and Wilson (2007), 
Introducing OCTAVE Allegro: Improving the Information Security Risk Assessment 
Process.  OCTAVE Allegro was developed for the purpose of “identifying, analyzing and 
prioritizing IS security risks” (Liu et al., 2009, p. 57).  Based on the findings of an 
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OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment, IS professionals are able to identify IS risks and 
prioritize mitigation efforts by developing security measures to reduce the impact of 
security incursions (Caralli et al., 2007; Kouns & Minoli, 2010). 
 
Problem Statement 
There is a lack of research that has addressed the challenge of conducting IS risk 
assessments in small-sized colleges and universities, defined as those academic 
institutions with 4,000 or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) students (Bougaardt & Kyobe, 
2011; Sanchez, Ruiz, Fernandez-Medina, & Piattini, 2010).  It is important for small-
sized post-secondary institutions to perform risk assessments (Sanchez et al., 2010), yet 
most risk assessment methodologies have been designed for larger institutions and are not 
appropriate for smaller ones (Beranek, 2011).  Small-sized colleges and universities 
should use an IS risk assessment methodology that has been proven to work effectively in 
an environment of their size (Beachboard et al., 2008). 
Performance of an IS risk assessment is more challenging in small-sized academic 
institutions than in large-sized ones due to the small-sized institution’s funding 
limitations and the absence of staff with expertise in the risk assessment arena 
(Beachboard et al., 2008; Jones, 2009; Yanosky, 2007).  In the absence of a practical, 
reliable, and easy-to-use risk assessment methodology, small-sized colleges and 
universities typically forego the performance of a risk assessment or conduct a risk 
assessment that lacks merit (Ewell, 2009).  
According to Keating (2012), data collected from 2011 EDUCAUSE Core Data 
Service’s surveys showed that 42% of United States (U.S.) small-sized institutions of 
higher education performed IS risk assessments on central administrative systems and 
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data.  In contrast, 68% of the largest-sized post-secondary institutions (more than 15,000 
FTE students) performed such assessments.  Although the number of institutions that 
perform IS risk assessments has increased over the last five years, it is still the case that 
fewer small-sized institutions perform IS risk assessments than do their large-sized 
counterparts (Keating, 2012).  Keating’s findings are in agreement with the most recent 
comprehensive studies on information security in higher education performed by the 
EDUCAUSE Center for Applied Research (ECAR; Kvavik, 2007) and Yanosky (2006).  
According to Yanosky, the majority of small-sized post-secondary institutions do not 
employ risk management strategies and seldom, if ever, perform risk assessments.  
Further, Kvavik, based on his classic ECAR study, stated, “The smaller the FTE [student] 
enrollment, the less likely an institution is to perform a [security] audit” (p. 66).   
Moreover, Beachboard et al. (2008) stated, “Appropriately applying the models [for 
performing risk analyses] in given organizational contexts represents a daunting task.  
This is particularly true for . . . small- and medium-sized enterprises” (p. 74).  
Beachboard et al. also indicated the need to use an appropriate risk assessment approach 
to “reduce the cognitive and financial burdens associated with conducting reasonably 
high-quality risk assessments” (p. 75). 
If IS risk assessments are not performed regularly as part of a robust risk management 
program, small-sized academic institutions are increasingly at risk of security incursions 
(Ewell, 2009) that can result from “vulnerable software, malicious actions, inadvertent 
user errors, [and] natural and human-made disasters” (Liu et al., 2009, p. 57).  
Additionally, academic networks that are not adequately secured can be used to launch 
cyber-attacks on other entities that result in the increase of security incursions at 
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corporations, government agencies, and other academic institutions (Kvavik, 2006).  
According to Culnan and Carlan (2009), security breaches at post-secondary institutions 
and their subsequent negative publicity can lead to a decline in donor contributions as 
well as financial loss that results from lawsuits.  
 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this investigation was to examine the effectiveness of OCTAVE Allegro 
as an IS risk assessment methodology in a small-sized, post-secondary institution in the 
U.S.  The OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment was conducted at George Fox University 
(GFU), a small-sized private university with approximately 3,500 FTE students and an IT 
staff of about 20 full-time employees (GFU, 2013b), located in Newberg, Oregon (GFU, 
2013a).  According to ECAR, a small-sized, post-secondary academic institution is 
defined as any college or university that has 4,000 or fewer FTE students (Keating, 2012; 
Smith & Caruso, 2010). 
The OCTAVE risk assessment methodology is available in three versions: the original 
OCTAVE method, OCTAVE-S for small organizations, and OCTAVE Allegro, a 
streamlined version (Liu et al., 2009).  The three versions share common underlying 
principles, such as being self-directed, being adaptable to an organization's requirements, 
following a defined process, and focusing on both organizational and technological issues 
(Caralli et al., 2007; Kouns & Minoli, 2010).  Although the original OCTAVE method 
and OCTAVE-S, developed by Alberts and Dorofee (2003), have successfully been used 
by larger colleges and universities to perform IS risk assessments (Woody, 2006), these 
methods are considered too difficult to implement at small-sized institutions of higher 
education (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2013). 
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Unlike the streamlined OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment methodology, which can be 
conducted by one or more IT professionals (Caralli et al., 2007), the original OCTAVE 
risk assessment is conducted through a series of workshops that require participation by 
employees from all organizational levels (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003).  Inasmuch as 
ensuring the security of IS resources is a complex task, the team that conducts the 
original OCTAVE method risk assessment must have extensive knowledge of IS security 
and risk management (Ekelhart, Fenz, & Neubauer, 2009), including a diverse set of IS 
security skills and experiences (Kouns & Minoli, 2010). 
Although the original OCTAVE method can be used by organizations of all sizes, this 
methodology was designed for organizations with more than 300 employees (Caralli et 
al., 2007).  OCTAVE-S, a variation of the original OCTAVE method, was introduced by 
Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens, and Woody (2005) in a document titled, “OCTAVE-S 
Implementation Guide.”  OCTAVE-S was designed for smaller organizations with fewer 
than 100 employees (Alberts et al., 2005).  Inasmuch as smaller organizations tend to be 
less hierarchical than are larger organizations, an OCTAVE-S risk evaluation can be 
successfully completed by three to five members of an analysis team who have “broad 
insight into the organization’s business and security processes” (Alberts et al., 2005, p. 
4).  Further, since the analysis team is assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the 
company’s information systems (ISs) and security requirements, there is no need to start 
the OCTAVE-S assessment process with formal workshops for information gathering as 
required by the original OCTAVE method (Alberts et al., 2005).  
According to Caralli et al. (2007), when compared to the earlier OCTAVE variations, 
OCTAVE Allegro is designed “to streamline and optimize the process of assessing 
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information security risks” (p. ix) and, thereby, produces “more robust results without the 
need for extensive risk assessment knowledge” (p. 4).  In contrast to the other versions of 
OCTAVE, which require involvement from people with substantial security expertise and 
can take months or years to complete, an organization can utilize OCTAVE Allegro to 
“obtain sufficient results with a small investment in time, people, and other limited 
resources” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. ix).  The use of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to 
perform a risk assessment can help a small-sized college or university in determining IS 
assets, identifying vulnerabilities and threats to these assets, evaluating risks, and 
prioritizing risk mitigation strategies (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Caralli et al., 2007) and 
thereby  “quickly improve its risk assessment capabilities” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. 27).  
 
Research Questions 
As noted, the goal of this investigation was to determine whether the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment methodology can be used within the particular constraints of the 
IT Department at GFU to effectively identify IS risks and prioritize risk mitigation 
efforts.  To this end, the following research questions (RQs) guided this investigation: 
RQ1.  To what extent is the OCTAVE Allegro methodology sufficiently 
straightforward for the IT staff at GFU to understand and conduct? (Appari & Johnson, 
2010).   
Many risk assessment methodologies, such as the original OCTAVE method, COBIT, 
and ISO/IEC 27005, are complex and require substantial training before an IT 
professional is able to use the chosen method to conduct a risk assessment.  GFU has 
approximately 20 full-time IT staff members (GFU, 2013b) but currently does not have a 
dedicated IS risk manager or IT staff with extensive risk management experience, so it is 
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important for the OCTAVE Allegro method to be easily understood by GFU IT staff 
(Beachboard et al., 2008; Caralli et al., 2007).   
RQ2.  To what extent will conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment help GFU 
IT staff to identify existing IS assets and classify them in order of importance to the 
mission of the organization? (Kouns & Minoli, 2010).   
One of the first steps in determining IS risks involves identifying IS assets and 
determining their relative value to the organization; otherwise, efforts can be wasted on 
analyzing assets that are non-critical to the organization’s mission.  Outcomes based on 
conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU should provide a clear picture 
of IS assets in relative order of importance to the business goals of the university (Caralli 
et al., 2007). 
RQ3.  To what extent will conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment help GFU 
IT staff in identifying and evaluating IS security concerns, including threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks in regard to existing IS assets? (Syalim et al., 2009).   
Providing a process to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to IS assets is 
fundamental to an effective risk assessment methodology (Peltier, 2010).  Findings from 
conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU should clarify existing risks to 
GFU’s IS assets (Caralli et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009). 
RQ4.  To what extent will the completion of a risk assessment using the OCTAVE 
Allegro methodology provide adequate information for GFU IT staff to prioritize the 
security measures that should be employed to secure their IS assets? (Peltier, 2010).   
The goal of performing an IS risk assessment is to identify important IS assets and to 
prioritize plans for reducing IS risk for each asset to a level that is acceptable to the 
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organization (Tohidi, 2011).  The performance of an IS risk assessment involves two 
major stages.  The first stage of the risk assessment involves identifying threats to IS 
assets and vulnerabilities within the IS (NIST JTF, 2011).  The second stage involves an 
analysis of the risk posed to the organization, based on the identified threats and 
vulnerabilities (NIST JTF, 2011).  Analyzing the identified risks, in terms of the potential 
impact on the organization, enables the risks to be prioritized (Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 
2011; Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2009).  Thus the outcome of the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment at GFU will provide clarity for IS risk mitigation plans and priorities 
(Caralli et al., 2007; Grajek, 2013; Liu et al., 2009). 
The research method used for this investigation was an exploratory case study, which 
was conducted at GFU.  Consent for the author to conduct the investigation at GFU is 
presented in Appendix A.  According to Sekaran and Bougie (2009), conducting an 
exploratory study is appropriate when the researcher needs to understand the important 
factors related to a process, such as a risk assessment in a small-sized university, for 
which there is little research.  Further, Yin (2009) noted that a case study is the most 
appropriate research method to use when the researcher needs to collect data on pertinent 
elements of the investigation from the context of an organization, such as a small-sized 
college or university.   
The investigator was able to use the OCTAVE Allegro methodology successfully 
within the constraints of this small-sized university due to OCTAVE Allegro’s 
streamlined design, potential to produce robust results with a relatively small 
commitment of time and resources, and ability to be used by IT professionals who lack 
extensive risk assessment expertise.  The results of this research demonstrated the 
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capabilities of OCTAVE Allegro in conducting an IS risk assessment at a small-sized 
university. 
 
Relevance and Significance 
Relevance  
According to the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and Network Security Task Force 
(2008), “Academia is recognized as an important resource in our national efforts to 
improve cybersecurity” (p. 2).  Haller, Merrell, Butkovic, and Wilke (2011) also reported 
that higher education institutions play a key role in helping to solve the problems of 
cybersecurity.  That NIST recently formed the National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Education (NIST, 2013) also highlights the significance of higher education in the 
national cybersecurity issue.  Institutions of higher education should be part of the 
solution to the problem of cybersecurity but, instead, are under threat in regard to their 
own data.  According to Grajek (2013), cyber-attacks against higher education networks 
are on the increase. Further, reports by Widup (2010) and the Identity Theft Resource 
Center (ITRC; 2012), show that data breaches at institutions of higher education have 
exposed millions of personal records in the last few years.  
According to Culnan and Carlin (2009), Blustain, Abraham et al. (in press), Groner 
and Brune (2012), and Jones (2009), additional research in risk assessment in higher 
education is needed as a means to identify appropriate risk assessment methods, develop 
security policies, and secure information assets.  A classic study by Burd (2006) also 
indicated that additional research remains necessary to enhance IS risk assessment 
methods and technologies so that “academic institutions do not become the weakest link 
in America’s information security chain” (Abstract, para. 3). 
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The EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and Network Task Force (2008) concluded its 
2008-2009 Strategic Plan by highlighting the urgency of protecting information assets 
and safeguarding private records and stakeholder data at colleges and universities. 
According to the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and Network Task Force, the 
development and implementation of “a risk management framework for protecting cyber 
assets” for colleges and universities is critically important (p. 5).  The classic studies by 
Yanosky (2007) and Voloudakis (2006) indicated that performing an IS risk assessment 
is an important part of a comprehensive risk management framework.  In the absence of a 
risk assessment, an institution of higher education remains unprepared to fend off or 
recover from breaches to their IS security.   
The relevance of performing a risk assessment also was described by Grajek (2013), 
who reported that over the past decade information technology security has ranked as a 
top issue for institutions of higher education.  According to Dodge (2009), information 
systems security breaches at institutions of higher education continue to increase.  As 
noted by Kvavik (2006), a vital concern in addressing IT and IS security is determining 
whether the institution conducted a comprehensive IS risk assessment.  According to 
Yanosky (2007), performing a risk assessment is a crucial step in enabling a post-
secondary institution to recover from potential disasters that could have an adverse 
impact on ongoing operations.   
The relevance of the present research also is supported by Bougaardt and Kyobe 
(2011) and Groner and Brune (2012), who noted that additional research in the area of 
risk management for small- and medium-sized entities, such as post-secondary 
institutions, remains necessary.  Importantly, Bougaardt and Kyobe stated that there has 
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been limited research done to help small institutions “recognise and account for losses 
from cyber-crime” (p. 167).  According to Groner and Brune, existing literature that 
focuses on the implementation of IS security measures in smaller institutions is limited.  
Additionally, in a classic study, Kvavik (2006) emphasized the need to provide a 
detailed “framework to simplify the risk assessment process” (p. 65) conducted at post-
secondary institutions.  Kvavik noted that EDUCAUSE supported the development of a 
risk assessment framework for academic institutions in 2005.  However, the current 
version of the EDUCAUSE initiative only provides “high-level guidance for an effective 
cyber-risk assessment and management process” (EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and 
Higher Education Information Security Council, 2013, para. 1). 
The EDUCAUSE risk assessment framework includes four phases: Strategic Risk 
Assessment Planning, Operational Data Collection, Risk Analysis, and Mitigation 
Planning, and provides the steps that must be performed to complete the assessment.  The 
framework is made for institutions of any size and is meant to be tailored to meet the 
needs of the institution.  Thus, the authors of the framework make clear that those using 
the framework need to make decisions about which parts of the framework are relevant to 
a particular situation as well as decide whether parts of the framework should be 
streamlined for certain situations (EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and Higher 
Education Information Security Council, 2013).   
Due to the EDUCAUSE risk assessment framework’s need to be tailored to fit an 
institution’s needs, the framework provides only an overview for performing risk 
assessments; it does not include adequately detailed guidance to enable personnel at 
small-sized post-secondary institutions to implement effective security solutions or to 
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properly conduct risk assessments (Beachboard et al., 2008; EDUCAUSE/Internet2 
Computer and Higher Education Information Security Council, 2013).  Thus, according 
to Sanchez et al. (2010), there is a need for further research to identify risk management 
methodologies that meet the particular needs of smaller-sized institutions.   
Significance 
The significance of this investigation is reflected in the sheer number of institutions 
that are classified as small and, thus, can benefit from the results of this investigation.  
According to the latest data collected by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement 
of Teaching (2010), there are approximately 2,500 academic institutions with 4,000 or 
fewer FTE students.  These small-sized colleges and universities comprise just over half 
of all existing U.S. post-secondary institutions.  Thus, the methodology utilized in this 
study can potentially be used by other similarly-sized institutions (Beachboard et al., 
2008). 
 
Barriers and Issues 
Culnan and Carlin (2009) noted that, due to the traditional open atmosphere of 
colleges and universities, ISs in institutions of higher education face more challenges 
than do commercial businesses when attempting to implement security requirements and 
perform risk assessments.  Similarly, according to Jones (2009), ISs in higher education 
are built on the premise of a free exchange of information, as seen in academia, and are 
designed to accommodate a diverse user population.  Jones reported that other types of 
businesses are often able to more stringently control access to information systems, 
whereas post-secondary institutions must leave data assets more accessible, thus making 
it more difficult to secure information assets at post-secondary institutions.  The 
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challenge of balancing open access to computing resources with IS security also is 
recognized by Grajek (2013), who listed one of the top ten IT issues of 2013 as “finding 
appropriate balance between infrastructure openness and security” (p. 42).  According to 
Luesebrink (2011), the openness and autonomy of campus networks are major barriers to 
implementing IS security in the academic environment.   
Another key barrier to effectively implementing IS security solutions and to 
performing risk assessments in post-secondary institutions, as identified by Groner and 
Brune (2012), is the lack of adequate financial and personnel resources.  According to 
Kvavik (2006), absence of IS risk assessments in post-secondary institutions is due to a 
lack of funding, the absence of skilled security personnel, and the overall perceived 
difficulty of performing an IS risk assessment.  Young (2010) also maintained that post-
secondary institutions often do not employ IT staff specifically trained for security 
management.   
As noted above, the general barriers to performing a risk assessment at large-sized 
colleges and universities include a lack of resources for IT security projects (Grajek, 
2013; Groner & Brune, 2012; Ingerman & Yang, 2011), IT staff’s inadequate training in 
IS security (Young, 2010), and the academic culture of openness (Grajek, 2013; Hedrick 
& Grama, 2013).  Research on IS risk management in higher education has tended to 
focus on larger universities (EDUCAUSE/Internet2, 2013), thereby neglecting the unique 
needs of small-sized post-secondary institutions.  In addition to the above-noted 
challenges for IS risk management at large-sized institutions, small-sized post-secondary 
institutions have other challenges, such as an acute lack of funding, the absence of the 
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required security expertise, and a lack of familiarity with IS security issues (Beachboard 
et al., 2008; Groner & Brune, 2012).   
 
Limitations and Delimitations  
In this investigation, the author conducted a case study at GFU as the IT staff 
completed an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment.  An OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
can be considered “comprehensive” if an institution analyzes the risks to all important IS 
assets and develops a risk mitigation plan for every IS asset determined to contain more 
risk than the organization is willing to tolerate.  However, the scope of this study was 
limited to GFU’s development of a risk mitigation plan for the single IS asset that they 
deem to be most at risk.  Therefore, this investigation is not considered a comprehensive 
risk assessment of all IS assets at GFU.  Further, although the long-term value of risk 
assessments was described by Kouns and Minoli (2010), Landoll (2011), and Peltier 
(2010), the author did not follow up with GFU after the completion of the case study to 
determine any long-term benefits to the IS security posture of GFU.  As such, the current 
investigation cannot be considered longitudinal. 
 
Definition of Terms 
Information asset (or IS data asset).  An information asset includes data (in electronic 
format or on paper) or other intellectual property that have value for the mission of an 
organization and that require protection (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003; Caralli et al., 2007; 
Kouns & Minoli, 2010).   
Information asset container (or Container).  Any item that holds an information asset 
(whether for storage, transportation, or processing) constitutes an information asset 
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container.  A container can consist of people, technology, or objects such as paper 
(Caralli et al., 2007). 
OCTAVE Allegro.  OCTAVE Allegro is the most recent OCTAVE variation 
developed by the CMU’s SEI for streamlining and optimizing assessments of risks to IS 
assets, thereby enabling an entity to prioritize risk mitigation efforts.  Compared with 
other versions of the OCTAVE method, OCTAVE Allegro requires less time and fewer 
staff member resources to complete as well as requires less training for IT staff to be 
competent to conduct.  OCTAVE Allegro focuses its assessment of risk on existing IS 
assets (Caralli et al., 2007).  
OCTAVE Allegro Documentation.  The OCTAVE Allegro methodology was first 
detailed in the 2007 document titled, “Introducing OCTAVE Allegro: Improving the 
Information Security Risk Assessment Process” (Caralli et al., 2007).  The appendices of 
that document contain specific steps with detailed activities for performance of the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment.  The OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment process 
involves the completion of worksheets that are included in the appendices of that 
document.  
OCTAVE Method.  The original version of the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, 
and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) risk assessment methodology is known as the 
OCTAVE method.  Developed in 1999 by the CMU’s SEI, it is typically used by larger 
organizations (300 or more employees; Alberts & Dorofee, 2003; Alberts, Behrens, 
Pethia & Wilson, 1999).  
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OCTAVE-S.  OCTAVE-S is an adaptation of the OCTAVE method created by CMU’s 
SEI for smaller organizations (100 employees or fewer), which tend to have a less 
prominent hierarchical structure than larger organizations (Alberts et al., 2005).  
Risk.  Risk refers to the potential negative effect to an organization (measured 
quantitatively or qualitatively) if a vulnerability of an IS asset is exploited by a threat, 
taking into consideration both the likelihood of the exploitation and the potential severity 
of impact on the organization (Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 2011; ISO/IEC, 2008; Kouns & 
Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011; Leeden, 2010; NIST JTF, 2012; Ponnam, Harrison, & 
Watson, 2009). 
Risk analysis.  A risk analysis is the calculation of the risk, based on the identified 
threats and vulnerabilities of the organization’s IS (Bruijn, Spruit, & van den Heuvel, 
2010; Landoll, 2011).  The calculation of risk is based on both the likelihood and the 
impact of a risk’s being exploited (Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 2011).  A risk analysis is 
carried out during the process of a risk assessment (Caralli et al., 2007; Kouns & Minoli, 
2010).  
Risk assessment.  Risk assessment is a process that enables IS risks to be identified 
and mitigated and comprises four overall phases.  The first phase of a risk assessment 
involves identifying both the threats to IS assets and the vulnerabilities in the IS.  The 
second phase concerns determining the actual risk that the threats and vulnerabilities pose 
to an organization.  The third phase of the risk assessment involves an evaluation of the 
risks and results in identified risks’ being prioritized according to organizational impact.  
The final phase of a risk assessment concerns planning the risk mitigation requirements 
as a means to bring risk down to a level that is acceptable to the organization (Caralli et 
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al., 2007; Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 2011; Landoll, 2011; Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 
2009; NIST JTF, 2011; Peltier, 2010).  
Risk management.  Risk management is a broad term that encompasses the processes 
associated with framing the risk environment, conducting a risk assessment, analyzing 
risk, mitigating existing risk, monitoring risk, and conveying information about risk to 
decision makers and other organizational stakeholders (Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 2011; 
Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2009; NIST JTF, 2011). 
Small-sized institution of higher education/small-sized post-secondary academic 
institution.  A small-sized institution of higher education refers to a college or university 
that has 4,000 or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) students (Keating, 2012; Smith & 
Caruso, 2010).  
Threat.  A threat is considered a potential occurrence of an event that produces a 
harmful outcome to an IS, whether caused by natural events, human attackers, or system 
errors (Landoll, 2011; NIST JTF, 2012).  A threat is realized when a threat source 
exploits an IS vulnerability (Caralli et al., 2007). 
Threat agent/threat source.  This refers to a particular source, such as a hacker or 
disgruntled employee, or situation, such as an act of nature or a system configuration 
error, that can potentially produce a threat (NIST JTF, 2012).  
Threat impact (or impact).  The impact of the realized threat event is the tangible and 
intangible costs to the organization that arise from the exploitation of a vulnerability 
(Leeden, 2010). 
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Threat likelihood (or likelihood).  The likelihood of a threat being realized is 
calculated based on the susceptibility of IS vulnerabilities to exploitation and the ability 
of the threat sources to create the undesired event (NIST JTF, 2012). 
Vulnerability.  A vulnerability is a potential weakness in an IS, or in the security 
controls for an IS, that makes an IS susceptible to exploitation by a threat agent.  Upon 
exploitation, a vulnerability can result in a security breach against an entity’s IS assets 
(European Network and Information Security Agency [ENISA], 2010; Ghernaouti-Helie 
et al., 2011; ISO/IEC, 2009; Landoll, 2011; NIST JTF, 2012).  
 
Summary 
The problem investigated in this study was the difficulty of conducting an effective IS 
risk assessment at a small-sized college or university; this difficulty is due to a lack of 
personnel with IT security skills and adequate funding for IS security projects.  In this 
regard, there is a need to validate an IS risk assessment methodology appropriate for use 
at small-sized colleges and universities.  The author examined the effectiveness of the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment’s being conducted within a small-sized post-secondary 
institution.  The research method used for this investigation was a case study, which was 
performed at GFU.  (A list of acronyms is found in Appendix B.) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
In this review of the literature, the author provides a foundation for this investigation 
(Cone & Foster, 2006; Levy & Ellis, 2006) that specifically involves the performance of 
a risk assessment of IS assets in a small-sized post-secondary institution (Ingerman & 
Yang, 2011; NIST JTF, 2011).  The first section contains the literature on the importance 
of IS risk assessment in the overall context of IS security and risk management for 
organizations and businesses of all sizes. In the second section, the author presents the 
research on the importance of IS security in higher education and the need to perform an 
IS risk assessment at post-secondary institutions.  The literature in the third section 
focuses on the current state of IS risk management in small-sized, post-secondary 
institutions and key challenges that must be addressed in conducting an IS risk 
assessment in small-sized colleges and universities, such as financial constraints and a 
lack of IT staff with extensive security expertise (Jones, 2009; NIST JTF, 2013; Yanosky, 
2007; Young, 2010).  The final section contains literature on OCTAVE Allegro that 
demonstrates how OCTAVE Allegro’s design and features enable this tool to be an ideal 
IS risk assessment methodology for small-sized colleges and universities (Appari & 
Johnson, 2010; Caralli et al., 2007).  
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IS Risk Management 
Risk-Based Approach 
Allen (2013) maintained that it is unreasonable to attempt to ensure that an IS asset is 
100% secure; all risks to information integrity cannot be anticipated or would cost too 
much in time and resources to eliminate.  According to Allen, organizations must employ 
a risk-based approach to risk management, which is an approach that entails assessing the 
level of risk associated with IS assets and reducing it to an acceptable level.  This risk-
based approach enables an entity such as a small-sized college or university to prioritize 
which security practices are most important to implement to mitigate risk (Allen, 2013).  
Allen’s findings are echoed by other researchers and industry experts, including 
Ingerman and Yang (2011), Kouns and Minoli (2010), Landoll (2011), and NIST JTF 
(2011). 
In his classic work on risk management, McCumber (2005) noted that experience has 
“taught both researchers and IT system managers that risk avoidance was simply 
untenable” (p. 71).  Thus, McCumber emphasized the need to employ a risk-based 
approach to security management as opposed to risk avoidance.  In arguing for a risk-
based approach, Johnson, Goetz, and Pfleeger (2009) stated, “Perfect security is 
unattainable, so the goal is risk mitigation, not risk elimination” (p. 49).  Further, 
McCallister, Grance, and Scarfone (2009) maintained that organizations of all sizes 
should attempt to protect information assets based on the existing level of risk rather than 
try to remove all risk to all IS assets. The risk-based approach entails the employment of 
a risk management process (Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011). 
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Understanding IS Risk Management  
The importance of managing IS risk within organizations is described by NIST JTF 
(2013), Ghernaouti-Helie et al. (2011), Landoll (2011), Kouns and Minoli (2010), Peltier 
(2010), and Beachboard et al. (2008).  NIST JTF indicated that ISs are subject to serious 
threats that include “environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and 
purposeful attacks” (p. 21).  Importantly, NIST JTF determined that these threats 
represent a significant danger to organizations of all sizes and maintained that effective 
management of IS risk is critically important to protect an organization’s core mission 
and to enable them to maintain their business functions.   
Although there are different standards and methodologies that delineate the risk 
management process, most of the widely accepted standards embrace four or five major 
phases (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2011).  NIST Special Publications (SPs) are widely accepted 
national standards (Ekelhart et al., 2009; Ghernaouti-Helie et al., 2011; Landoll, 2011).  
This author conceptualized IS risk management as described in NIST SP 800-39 (NIST 
JTF, 2011).  According to NIST SP 800-39, a comprehensive process for managing IS 
risk comprises four overarching steps: framing risk, assessing risk, responding to risk, 
and monitoring risk.  In framing risk, an organization decides on an IS risk management 
strategy based on its assumptions, priorities, and constraints for dealing with risk.  The 
second step is assessing risk, which involves identifying IS threats and vulnerabilities and 
then determining the risk to the IS posed by these threats and vulnerabilities.  The third 
step of IS risk management is responding to the risk, which involves deciding on and 
implementing a course of action to reduce the risk to acceptable levels.  The fourth step is 
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monitoring the risk, which allows an organization to observe changes that occur in the 
risk to the IS and to respond appropriately.  
Within the overall risk management process, the central component involves 
conducting the risk assessment, the outcome of which provides the necessary information 
to prioritize and mitigate IS risk.  According to NIST JTF (2012) the step of assessing IS 
risk “is one of the key components of an organizational risk management process” (p. 1).  
Further, Liu et al. (2009) stated that performing an IS risk assessment as part of the risk 
management process is “critical for identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing IT security 
risks” (p. 57). 
Importance of IS Risk Assessment 
According to Yanosky (2007), an effective risk management methodology includes 
conducting periodic risk assessments.  As indicated in Title III of the E-Government Act 
of 2002 (Public Law 107-347, also known as the Federal Information Security 
Management Act [FISMA]), an important component of an effective information security 
program is the periodic completion of a risk assessment (NIST JTF, 2011).  Tohidi 
(2011) found that performing a risk assessment plays a critical role in prioritizing risks 
and securing IS data.  Tohidi’s conclusions are in keeping with the findings of Blustain, 
Abraham et al. (in press), who maintain that performing an IS risk assessment is the 
foundation for an effective risk management strategy.  According to Blustain, Abraham et 
al., IS security risks must be identified by a risk assessment before these can be properly 
managed within an institution of higher education.  
The importance of performing IS risk assessments by institutions of all sizes also is 
noted by Beachboard et al. (2008), who stated that conducting an IS risk assessment is a 
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key element in ensuring effective risk management.  Johnson et al. (2009) noted that 
“accurate risk assessment reduces exposure to unexpected losses and helps price risk 
more effectively” (p. 47).  Moreover, in the latest version of the National 
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, the National 
Counterintelligence Policy Board (2009) reported that assessment of human and 
technological vulnerabilities “is an integral part of the essential and continual task of risk 
management” (p. 2).   
According to Ghernaouti-Helie, Simms, and Tashi (2009) and Ponnam et al. (2009), 
the main purpose of performing an effective risk assessment is to prioritize security 
efforts for valuable information assets, such as electronic and physical copies of student 
and financial information, which are vital to the continued operation of the institution.  
Because, for most organizations, the cost, in terms of personnel and financial resources, 
of mitigating all IS risks is impossible (Allen, 2013; McCumber, 2005), it is important to 
have a method to prioritize risk mitigation efforts.  Bruijn et al. (2010) asserted that one 
of the greatest benefits of performing a risk assessment is that the most significant threats 
to the institution of higher education can be identified, and cost-effective mitigation 
decisions that reduce risk to an acceptable level can be made.  Thus, an effective risk 
assessment can help preserve the financial and personnel resources of an organization 
(Peltier, 2010).   
Key Elements of an IS Risk Assessment 
Researchers and practitioners have provided various descriptions of the IS risk 
assessment process.  Generally, these investigators, such as ENISA (2012), Ghernaouti-
Helie et al. (2011), and Nikolic and Ruzic-Dimitrijevic (2009), include three overall 
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phases in the risk assessment process: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk 
evaluation.  Other well-respected researchers of risk assessment methods, such as Caralli 
et al. (2007), Ewell (2009), Landoll (2011), McCumber (2005), Peltier (2010), and 
Syalim et al. (2009), include a fourth phase, that of risk mitigation planning.  This author 
included risk mitigation planning in the definition of the risk assessment process since 
risk mitigation is the immediate goal of the risk assessment process (NIST JTF, 2011).  
The risk identification phase includes developing an inventory of the IS assets controlled 
by the organization (Caralli et al., 2007; Voloudakis, 2006) and identifying the 
vulnerabilities of the IS and the threats to the IS (NIST JTF, 2012).  Risk analysis 
involves determining the likelihood of the occurrence of a threat-source that successfully 
exploits an IS vulnerability and causes a negative impact to the organization.  The risk 
evaluation phase involves prioritizing risks based on the most significant negative 
impacts that are most likely to occur.  Based on these phases of the risk assessment, an 
organization can prioritize which IS risks need to be mitigated.  The outcome of the risk 
assessment process is to produce a plan for mitigating IS risk to a level that is acceptable 
to the organization (Ewell, 2009; Peltier, 2010). 
The key concepts associated with performing a risk assessment are system 
vulnerabilities, threats to ISs, likelihood of a threat event that compromises an IS 
vulnerability, impact of the security breach, risk, and risk analysis (Landoll, 2011; Kouns 
& Minoli, 2010).  These concepts are briefly described in this section and are defined in 
Chapter 1.  The overall risk assessment process includes identifying IS threats and 
vulnerabilities.  A vulnerability is a potential weakness in an IS, or in the security 
controls for an IS, that, upon exploitation, can result in a security breach against an 
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entity’s IS assets (ENISA, 2010; ISO/IEC, 2009; Landoll, 2011; NIST JTF, 2012).  A 
threat is considered a potential occurrence of an event that produces a harmful outcome to 
an IS, whether caused by natural events, human attackers, or system errors (Landoll, 
2011; NIST JTF, 2012).  The agent or situation that can potentially produce the threat is 
known as the threat source or threat agent (NIST JTF. 2012).  A threat is realized when a 
threat source exploits an IS vulnerability (Caralli et al., 2007).  
Risk is measured by a quantitative or qualitative calculation determined by the 
likelihood of the threat event and the impact on the organization (Kouns & Minoli, 2010; 
Leeden, 2010; NIST JTF, 2012).  A risk analysis is the calculation of the risk, based on 
the identified threats and vulnerabilities of the organization’s IS (Bruijn et al., 2010; 
Landoll, 2011).  The likelihood of a negative event’s occurring should be calculated 
based on the susceptibility of exploitation of the IS vulnerabilities and the ability of the 
threat sources to create the undesired event (NIST JTF, 2012).  The impact of the threat 
event comprises the tangible and intangible costs to the organization that arise from the 
exploitation (Leeden, 2010).  
 
IS Security in Higher Education 
According to Hedrick and Grama (2013), institutions of higher education, such as 
GFU, possess large amounts data, “including personal information of employees and 
students, sensitive institutional business data, and faculty research data” (p. 2).  However, 
as noted by Marks and Rezgui (2009), in contrast to typical businesses, higher education 
institutions generally provide open access to information resources for students and 
faculty.  Marks and Rezgui noted that allowing open access to large amounts of personal 
data makes higher education institutions, such as GFU, susceptible to cyber-attacks.  
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Culnan and Carlin (2009) explained that institutions of higher education, such as GFU, 
typically have large amounts of computing power and allow access to large amounts of 
private information through their network and the Internet.  The availability of such 
information over a public network puts university ISs at risk of security breaches.  
Yanosky (2009) reported that the amount of critical electronic data that colleges and 
universities have on their networks continues to increase and that this information needs 
to be protected.  Agee and Yang (2009) argue that IT departments in higher education are 
challenged to find a balance between preventing unauthorized access to personal data and 
maintaining an atmosphere of open information sharing.  
EDUCAUSE reported that, every year from 2003 to 2010, IT departments in higher 
education have listed data security as one of the top three items considered vital for 
strategic success (Ingerman & Yang, 2010); in 2011, it was still the fourth most important 
issue (Ingerman & Yang, 2011).  However, from 2009 to 2011, the area of greatest 
concern to IT departments in colleges and universities involved funding of IT projects 
and initiatives (Agee & Yang, 2009; Ingerman & Yang, 2010, 2011).  According to 
Ingerman and Yang (2010), security breaches at institutions of higher education continue 
to increase in severity, and yet the funds to address IS security requirements are scarce.  
Further, Ingerman and Yang (2010) determined that IS security will continue to be a top 
concern for institutions of higher education for the foreseeable future.  
Data Breaches at Higher Education Institutions  
Information stored in the ISs of institutions like GFU continues to be the target of data 
theft (Collins, Sainato, & Khey, 2011; Marks & Rezgui, 2009; Widup, 2010).  According 
to Collins et al., almost half of all security breaches that were reported in the U.S. in 2005 
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occurred at institutions of higher education.  Collins et al. added, however, that the high 
percentage of reported breaches was most likely due to the greater reporting transparency 
in the education sector than in other industry sectors.  According to Widup, from 2005 to 
2009, a total of 549 data breach incidents occurred at institutions of higher education.  
These 549 breaches resulted in the disclosure of over 10 million personal records to 
unauthorized persons.  Further, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC; 2011) report 
for 2010 listed a total of 65 educational sector breaches, resulting in the exposure of 1.6 
million records.  According to ITRC (2012), in 2011 there were another 59 breaches, 
with 800,000 records exposed.  Thus, there continues to be a significant unintended 
disclosure of personal information from data contained in higher education ISs.  
Culnan and Carlin (2009) described some of the negative consequences that can arise 
from data breaches in higher education.  They noted that, when one large university had 
five security breaches over a three-month period, the public perceived that the university 
maintained a lax attitude toward security.  Further, the university suffered an 8% decline 
in donor contributions in the year following the admission of the security breaches and 
was subjected to lawsuits.  Talbot and Jakeman (2009) also reported that IS security 
breaches can lead to financial losses, legal challenges, and damage to organizational 
reputation.  
Need for Risk Management at Institutions of Higher Education 
Ingerman and Yang (2010) indicated that determining the right amount of funding to 
spend on IS security investments is an important consideration for higher education. 
Importantly, according to Bruijn et al. (2010) and Peltier (2010), performing a risk 
assessment can help preserve limited IT funds by identifying the greatest security risks 
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and prioritizing security measures to prevent incursions resulting from security risks.  
The prioritization of spending on security-related IT purchases is critical as institutions of 
higher education struggle with obtaining adequate funding for IT projects and initiatives 
(Grajek, 2013; Ingerman & Yang, 2011).  However, according to Grajek and Arroway 
(2012), in 2011 fewer than 50 percent of all U.S. institutions of higher education 
performed a risk assessment on central administrative systems and data.  Ghernaouti-
Helie et al. (2011) noted that, without the completion of a relevant analysis of IS risk, 
applied security measures and technologies are ineffective; they will either cause a waste 
of money or will lead to an inaccurate understanding of the organization’s IS security 
situation.  
Ewell (2009) presents a strong case that institutions of higher education must follow a 
risk management methodology to identify, prioritize, and reduce IS risk, just as non-
educational businesses should.  Ewell argues that performing a risk assessment is the only 
way to objectively identify IS risk and use limited IT funds to prioritize which security 
measures to implement.  According to Ewell, colleges and universities must use a 
dependable risk assessment methodology or the results will not be valid for use by the 
organization.  Without an accurate risk assessment, institutions of higher education will 
not be able to effectively use their limited personnel and financial resources to secure 
their ISs.  
Jones (2009) conducted an empirical study at a small university to determine the 
security of IS data at the institution.  By viewing existing forms, conducting interviews, 
observing processes, and collecting data from structured questionnaires, he developed an 
understanding of the security of personally identifiable information at the university.  He 
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found that the university had some security strategies in place but that they were not fully 
implemented and, thus, certain faculty, staff, and student information remained 
vulnerable to security threats.  Jones’ top recommendation for improving the security at 
the university was that it should conduct a comprehensive IS security assessment to 
further identify all vulnerabilities and risks within the institution.  Jones felt that the 
university was overly confident of its security because it was unaware of the 
vulnerabilities of its IS data and that it needed to conduct a risk assessment.  
According to Bruijn et al. (2010), Ewell (2009), and Jones (2009), colleges and 
universities must perform comprehensive risk assessments on their IS assets so that 
resources can be prioritized toward the assets at greatest risk of compromise.  Without a 
risk management framework that includes a risk assessment, institutions in higher 
education will either waste time and money on security measures that do not represent the 
institution’s highest priorities or may have an unfounded or inaccurate view of their 
security situation.  Performance of a proven and repeatable risk assessment methodology, 
such as OCTAVE Allegro, COBIT, or the Central Computer and Telecommunications 
Agency’s (CCTA) Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM), will provide 
colleges and universities with an accurate view of IS assets risks and enable the 
identification and prioritization of security measures that should be implemented.  
Accordingly, Grajek (2013) maintained that all post-secondary institutions should 
complete a comprehensive IS risk assessment to help “identify the most-pressing risks 
and prioritize resources” (p. 44).   
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Lack of Risk Assessment at Institutions of Higher Education  
Despite the need for comprehensive IS risk assessments in institutions of higher 
education, as noted by Bruijn et al. (2010), Ewell (2009), Ingerman and Yang (2011), and 
Jones (2009), in 2011 fewer than 50 percent of all U.S. higher education institutions 
completed an IS risk assessment of central administrative systems and data, such as 
student financial aid, academic records, and institutional financial information (Grajek & 
Arroway, 2012).  According to Grajek and Arroway, who used comprehensive survey 
data collected by ECAR in 2011, 68% of U.S. colleges and universities conducted risk 
assessments of information assets under the control of central IT, such as faculty and staff 
usernames and passwords.  However, Grajek and Arroway noted that only 47% of 
campuses conducted risk assessments of central administrative systems and data.   
According to Blustain, Chinniah et al. (in press), it is essential that central administrative 
systems be subject to comprehensive risk assessments, as they contain the private data of 
students, faculty, staff, and donors.   
NIST JTF (2012) noted that it is critical to monitor IS risks on an ongoing basis.  It is 
not adequate to perform an IS risk assessment at one time and then not continue to 
monitor its effectiveness and take action based on changes to the IS, institutional 
priorities, or the threat environment.  According to Lang, Grama, Norin, and Workman 
(2013), the percentage of U.S. colleges and universities where risk assessments of IS 
assets were performed decreased in 2013 when compared to the previous two years.  This 
decrease indicates that IT departments at higher education institutions are not performing 
continuous IS risk assessments and, thus, are leaving their IS assets vulnerable to 
unassessed risks.  
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IS Security and Risk Management in Small Post-Secondary Institutions 
Security and Risk in Small-sized Institutions of Higher Education  
Small-sized colleges and universities, those with 4,000 or fewer FTE students 
(Keating, 2012; Smith & Caruso, 2010), are like their larger counterparts in many ways; 
they collect customer data, have large amounts of computing power, and allow relatively 
open access to data (Hedrick & Grama, 2013; Kouns & Minoli, 2011; Sanchez et al., 
2010). These institutions have the same responsibility as do large-sized ones to protect 
customer data and IS assets from cyber-threats.  However, these small-sized 
organizations face additional challenges to safeguarding the integrity of their IS assets 
(Beranek, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010). Specifically, smaller-sized colleges and 
universities usually have fewer financial resources and IT personnel with security 
expertise than do their larger counterparts (Beachboard et al., 2008; Bougaardt & Kyobe, 
2011; Sanchez et al., 2010).  
According to Sanchez et al. (2010), using a risk management approach is critical in 
smaller institutions, just as in larger ones.  Yanosky’s (2007) classic study noted that 
performing an IS risk assessment is an important part of business continuity planning and 
creating the ability for a post-secondary institution of any size to survive an unforeseen 
disaster.  In a classic study of IS security in colleges and universities, Kvavik (2006) also 
noted that conducting an IS risk assessment was essential to institutions of higher 
education, regardless of size, a conclusion that is supported by Sanchez et al. 
Lack of Risk Assessment at Small-sized Institutions 
As noted, the performance of an IS risk assessment is critical for small-sized 
institutions of higher education (Beachboard et al., 2008; Bougaardt & Kyobe, 2011; 
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Kvavik, 2006; Sanchez et al., 2010, Yanosky, 2007). Smaller institutions, however, fail to 
use a risk management method to control IS risk at a far higher rate than do larger 
institutions.  According to a recent ECAR survey of IS security in higher education, only 
42% of small-sized institutions reported conducting a risk assessment on central 
administrative systems and data, such as student records, financial data, and human 
resources data (Keating, 2012).  In contrast, 68% of the largest-sized institutions (more 
than 15,000 FTE) reported that they conduct risk assessments in regard to such data.   
Keating (2012) noted that there is a direct correlation between the size of a college or 
university and the likelihood of performing an IS risk assessment.  As seen in Table 1, 
data collected from U.S. higher education institutions by the EDUCAUSE Core Data 
Service in 2011 showed that only 42% of small-sized colleges and universities performed 
a risk assessment of central administrative systems and data, whereas 55% of medium-
sized institutions completed a risk assessment of these assets, and 68% of the largest-
sized colleges and universities did so.  Similar percentages are shown for performing a 
risk assessment of data assets administered by an institution’s central IT organization; the 
smaller the college or university, the less likely it is to have performed a risk assessment 
on these IS assets.   
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Table 1.  IS Risk Assessment Data for Colleges and Universities in 2011 (Keating, 2012) 
IS Risk Assessments for all U.S. 
Colleges and Universities in 2011 
Administrative 
Systems & Data 
Central IT Systems & 
Infrastructure 
All Institutions 51% 66% 
Small (4,000 FTE or fewer) 42% 58% 
Medium (4,000 to 15,000 FTE) 55% 70% 
Large (more than 15,000 FTE)  68% 76% 
 
Prior to Keating’s (2012) research, the most recent ECAR analyses of risk assessment 
performance by size of higher education institution were the classic studies of Kvavik 
(2006) and Yanosky (2007).  Findings by Keating about the correlation between the size 
of the institution and likelihood of performing an IS risk assessment are in keeping with 
the findings of Kvavik and Yanosky.  Kvavik stated, “The smaller the FTE enrollment, 
the less likely an institution is to perform [a security] audit” (p. 66) or to complete a 
comprehensive IS risk assessment.  Yanosky also reported that smaller institutions were 
much less likely to complete a risk assessment than were larger institutions. 
Challenges of Performing Risk Assessments at Small-sized Institutions 
According to Sanchez et al. (2010), most small organizations in the U.S. and the 
United Kingdom differ from large-sized organizations in that they lack the finances and 
adequately trained security personnel to perform IS risk assessments.  Further, because 
most widely accepted IS risk management methods were created for larger organizations, 
small-sized organizations are unable to use these methods to obtain meaningful risk 
assessment results.  For instance, Sanchez et al. maintained that risk management 
methods such as CRAMM, OCTAVE, ISO/IEC 27005, and COBIT are difficult for 
small-sized institutions to apply as they require too many resources and are difficult to 
35 
 
 
 
administer.  Sanchez et al. also noted that the unique characteristics of small-sized 
institutions beg for the development of a risk assessment methodology designed 
specifically to meet their needs.  A risk management method created for small 
organizations would have such characteristics as “flexibility, simplicity and cost 
efficiency (human and time-related)” (Sanchez et al., 2012, p. 425).  
Beachboard et al. (2008) and Groner and Brune (2012) found issues in the 
methodologies available for small- and medium-sized institutions to perform IS risk 
analyses, such as their being expensive, complicated, and difficult to validate, and thus 
argued for the need to develop an IS risk assessment methodology that meets the unique 
needs for small organizations.  Beachboard et al., Beranek (2011), and Groner and Brune 
found that properly applying existing risk analysis models, such as OCTAVE-S (Alberts 
et al., 2005), ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO/IEC, 2008), and FRAAP (Peltier, 2010) presents an 
overwhelming task for small organizations due to their lack of security expertise and 
limited financial resources.  Beachboard et al. reported that small-sized organizations are 
less likely to employ a large IT staff with dedicated security resources or extensive IS 
security expertise required to apply these IS risk assessment methods.   
In addition to Sanchez et al. (2010) and Beachboard et al. (2008), Beranek (2011) also 
noted the need to create an IS risk management approach designed specifically for small- 
and medium-sized organizations.  The design objectives for an effective IS risk 
management methodology in small-sized organizations include its not requiring extensive 
security expertise, ability to document an organization’s important IS assets and risks, 
and being relatively easy to use and low cost (Beranek, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010).  
Despite their understanding of these design principles, neither Sanchez et al., Beachboard 
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et al., or Beranek made mention of OCTAVE Allegro, which is a well-established risk 
assessment methodology that already has met the design objectives for small-sized 
institutions by its being easy to use, not requiring security expertise, and effectively 
allowing an organization to assess IS assets and risks “with a small investment in time, 
people, and other limited resources” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. ix).  
 
OCTAVE Allegro 
The OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment method was first detailed in 2007 by Caralli et 
al. and published by Carnegie Mellon University’s SEI.  This document provided an 
overview of the methodology, detailed instructions on how to perform an OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment, and standardized worksheets that are completed during the risk 
assessment process.  OCTAVE Allegro belongs to the OCTAVE family of IS risk 
methodologies that have been well accepted both in the research community and in the IS 
risk management industry (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 
2011; Liu et al., 2009).   
As noted, the three versions of the OCTAVE methodology include the original 
OCTAVE method, OCTAVE-S, and OCTAVE Allegro.  These methods share common 
design principles.  Each methodology is self-directed, follows a defined process, is 
adaptable to the organization that conducts the risk assessment, and focuses on 
organizational and technological assets (Caralli et al., 2007).  The original OCTAVE 
method was designed for organizations with 300 or more employees (Caralli et al., 2007).  
Use of the original OCTAVE method requires participants who are very knowledgeable 
about IS risk management and necessitates a substantial investment of time and effort to 
successfully complete (Sanchez et al., 2010). 
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Although OCTAVE-S was designed for smaller organizations of 100 or fewer 
employees, the use of OCTAVE-S still requires a team of three to five IS risk 
management experts who have a broad understanding of the IT configuration and security 
structure of the organization (Alberts et al., 2005).  In contrast to the other OCTAVE 
methods, OCTAVE Allegro is a streamlined process that provides accurate IS risk 
assessment results with a smaller investment of time and resources and does not require 
extensive IS security or risk management experience (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Caralli et 
al., 2007). 
Along with OCTAVE and OCTAVE-S, numerous methodologies are currently 
available for large- and medium-sized organizations to perform IS risk assessments.  
These methodologies include NIST’s Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (NIST SP 
800-30); CRAMM; the Specification for an Information Security Management System 
(as defined by ISO/IEC 27005); and FRAAP (Beachboard et al., 2008; Beranek, 2011; 
Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011; Liu et al., 2009).  In contrast to the 
aforementioned methodologies, OCTAVE Allegro is a streamlined process, requiring less 
IS security expertise to conduct, and provides standardized worksheets and detailed 
instructions for doing an IS risk assessment that can be cost-effectively implemented by 
small-sized post-secondary institutions (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Caralli et al., 2007).   
Further, the training requirements to learn the OCTAVE Allegro method are much 
fewer than for many of the other risk assessment methods available (Caralli et al., 2007).  
Thus, using the OCTAVE Allegro method would “reduce the training and knowledge 
prerequisites for participants” (Appari & Johnson, 2010, p. 296).  With OCTAVE 
Allegro, small-sized institutions can “obtain sufficient results with a small investment in 
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time, people, and other limited resources” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. ix).  Moreover, 
OCTAVE Allegro offers a qualitative risk management approach with an optional 
quantitative component (Caralli et al., 2007).  According to Liu et al. (2009), a qualitative 
risk assessment is simpler and faster to complete than is a comprehensive quantitative 
assessment. 
The classic study by Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) noted that, in addition to 
addressing the risks associated with technical vulnerabilities, an effective IS risk 
assessment methodology should identify and address non-technological risks, such as 
those created by business processes and human factors.  The need to address both 
technical- and process-oriented IS risks is also noted by Holgate, Williams, and Hardy 
(2012).  An OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment highlights vulnerabilities and risks created 
by the use of technology as well as identifies non-technology-based risks by enabling an 
organization “to consider people, technology, and facilities in the context of their 
relationship to information and the business processes and services they support” (Caralli 
et al., 2007, p. ix). 
Caralli et al. (2007) noted that the documentation provided in the OCTAVE Allegro 
method features standardized worksheets, thereby eliminating the need to purchase 
expensive documentation or require the expertise to create useful reports.  Meaningful 
results can be obtained by conducting a one-time, comprehensive, institution-wide IS risk 
assessment or by applying the standardized OCTAVE Allegro worksheets to individual 
IS assets.  By utilizing OCTAVE Allegro worksheets to conduct IS risk assessments of 
individual assets, a college or university can incrementally build a comprehensive view 
of IS risks, eliminating the need to overlook other priorities, while taking extended time 
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to conduct a comprehensive IS risk assessment (Caralli et al., 2007).  Thus, the OCTAVE 
Allegro IS risk assessment method has the features that enable a small-sized college or 
university to be able to complete a meaningful risk assessment, using limited time and 
resources.  
 
Summary  
The literature presented confirms the importance of using a risk-based management 
approach for planning IS risk mitigation for organizations of all sizes (Ingerman & Yang, 
2011; Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011; and NIST JTF, 2011).  A comprehensive 
risk management plan includes the periodic performance of an IS risk assessment 
(Landoll, 2011; Liu et al., 2009) to enable an organization to prioritize its risk-mitigation 
efforts (Beachboard et al., 2008; NIST JTF, 2011; Tohidi, 2011).  The literature on IS 
security in higher education shows that, in view of the amount of critical data stored on 
college and university networks, the number of cyber-attacks against these institutions 
continues to have a significant impact on their ISs (Collins et al., 2011; ITRC, 2011; 
Widup, 2010).  Further, almost half of these post-secondary institutions have never 
completed a comprehensive IS risk assessment (Bruijn et al., 2010; Grajek & Arroway, 
2012).  The literature on IS security in small-sized post-secondary institutions shows that 
most small-sized colleges and universities lack the skills and finances to effectively 
perform needed IS risk assessments (Beachboard et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2010).  
Overall, the literature confirms the need to identify an appropriate risk assessment 
methodology, such as OCTAVE Allegro, to meet the unique needs of small-sized 
colleges and universities (Beachboard et al., 2008; Beranek, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010).  
Research also confirms that OCTAVE Allegro is a popularly accepted IS risk assessment 
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methodology that can successfully be used at small colleges and universities for 
completing an effective risk assessment (Appari & Johnson, 2010). 
41 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Research Design 
The author used an exploratory case study for this investigation.  According to 
Sekaran and Bougie (2009), utilization of an exploratory qualitative study is appropriate 
when additional information is sought to understand the important factors related to a 
process such as a risk assessment.  Further, Yin (2009) noted that, for exploratory 
research, through which the researcher seeks to understand a phenomenon within its 
context, a case study is the most appropriate method because it allows the researcher to 
capture the pertinent elements from the context of an organization, such as a college or 
university.  Importantly, the classic study by Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent (1998) noted 
that a case study is “the most widely used qualitative research method in information 
systems research” (p. 273).  Darke et al. also observed that case study research is a good 
tool for researchers who attempt to understand technology-related processes within 
organizational contexts.  Finally, the classic study by Creswell (2003) stated that case 
study research is an appropriate strategy to use in exploring a process such as a risk 
assessment. 
The OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment methodology has been successfully 
implemented at companies within various industries, such as state government agencies 
(Curtis, 2009) and financial institutions (DeSot, 2008; Jenkins, 2009). The purpose of this 
study was to determine the effectiveness of OCTAVE Allegro in a small-sized university, 
namely, GFU, located in Newberg, Oregon.  Consent for the author to conduct the 
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investigation at GFU is presented in Appendix A.  Prior to conducting this research, the 
author served as an adjunct faculty member at GFU but currently has no affiliation with 
GFU.   
GFU, a small-sized, independent university with approximately 3,500 FTE students 
and 20 full-time IT staff members, provided the context for this case study (GFU, 2013a; 
GFU, 2013b).  Yin (2009) indicated that it is appropriate to choose a single case for 
conducting case study research when the selected institution is representative or typical of 
other similar institutions.  Although the unique study by Schuman (2005) noted that small 
post-secondary institutions in the U.S. are diverse, he nevertheless chose GFU as one of 
12 institutions that are typical of small-sized institutions of higher education in the U.S.  
Additionally, the selection of GFU was based on the willingness of the IT staff at GFU to 
participate in the study, as indicated in Appendix A. 
When the author initiated contact with GFU in regard to the risk assessment project, 
GFU had one person assigned to oversee IS security, namely, Mr. Sean McKay, who was 
the Director of Administrative Computing and operated as Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO).  Mr. McKay was involved in the initial planning meeting for the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU but left employment at GFU before the risk 
assessment project started.  The author worked initially with Mr. McKay and then two 
other GFU IT staff to complete the risk assessment.  Mr. McKay and the IT staff involved 
in the risk assessment are collectively referred to as “GFU IT contacts.”  The author 
interviewed GFU IT staff individuals before and after the risk assessment process and 
conducted observations of their conduct of the IS risk assessment, including their 
completing the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets.   
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Specific Research Method Employed 
In this research, the author investigated the extent to which OCTAVE Allegro 
provided an effective risk assessment methodology for GFU in terms of how much 
training was required for participants, whether risks to IS assets were identified, and how 
well GFU was able to prioritize IT security efforts based on the outcome of the risk 
assessment.  Prior to the risk assessment, the author collected baseline data, using the 
methods described below, including examining archival records, interviewing GFU IT 
staff, and conducting direct observations.  The author also collected data during the risk 
assessment process and at the completion of GFU’s OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment.   
According to Yin (2009), a case study involves utilization of multiple sources of data, 
including a review of archival records and current documentation as well as various data 
collection methods, including interviews and direct observations.  Findings from these 
multiple sources were corroborated to validate the research conclusions, a process that 
Yin calls “triangulation” (p. 116).  Gillham (2008) also emphasized the importance of 
triangulation through the convergence of “different kinds of data (or different sources) 
bearing on the same issue” (p. 29).  Gillham stated that a core element of case study 
research involves this “multi-method approach” (p. 49), which relies on this convergence 
of evidence from different data sources.  The author triangulated the research findings 
obtained by examining GFU documents and records, conducting interviews of GFU IT 
staff, and observing GFU IT staff during the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment process. 
Documents 
Yin (2009) stated, “Documents play an explicit role in any data collection in doing 
case studies. . . . there is little excuse for omitting a thorough review of documentary 
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evidence” (pp. 103-104).  Thus, before the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment was 
initiated at GFU, the author reviewed all relevant documentation related to the security 
and risk assessment, including all of GFU’s security policies (GFU, 2013b).  The author 
used the information found in these policies, along with other data, described below, to 
establish a baseline understanding of the IS security stance, risk awareness, and risk 
mitigation plans at GFU.  This baseline was used as a comparison against which to 
document the changes in GFU’s risk awareness that occurred during and at the 
conclusion of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment.  At the conclusion of the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment, GFU’s risk awareness, as highlighted by various documents 
produced during the risk assessment conducted in this investigation, such as lists and 
values of IS assets, number and types of documented threats and vulnerabilities, and 
documented risks and risk mitigation plans, was compared to GFU’s initial security 
baseline condition, and the degree of change was determined. 
Archival Records 
According to Yin (2009), archival records also are an important source of information 
in case studies.  Thus, the author examined existing archival records related to IS security 
at GFU, which mainly included internally and externally reported security breaches, 
documents concerning the implementation of security equipment or practices at GFU, 
and documented malware detection methods used at GFU (Caralli et al., 2007; Peltier, 
2010; Whitman & Mattord, 2010).   
Interviews 
Yin (2009) indicated that interviews are an essential part of any case study.  According 
to Gillham (2008), interviews are “indispensable in case study research” (p. 59).  Gillham 
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also indicated that all interviews fall on a continuum between structured and 
unstructured, with the structured interviews as more formal in nature.  According to 
Gillham, formal interviews are those that include predefined, structured, or semi-
structured questions, whereas informal interviews are those that take place naturally 
during conversations with participants throughout the case study.  The author conducted 
both formal interviews, using semi-structured questions, and informal interviews to 
identify details of IS security management at GFU.  Formal interviews were conducted 
before and after the performance of the risk assessment at GFU.  Information collected 
included whether IS assets were prioritized according to their value, how IS asset 
vulnerability and risk were calculated, how security concerns were identified, how 
spending on security products was prioritized, and how GFU personnel reviewed and 
selected security mitigation measures to implement (Peltier, 2010; Whitman & Mattord, 
2010).  During the interview process, the author sought to determine the GFU IT 
contacts’ understanding of the IS risk situation at GFU, in general, and of specific 
security-related issues, including their understanding of GFU’s mission-critical assets, 
current vulnerabilities and threats, and risk mitigation priorities.   
According to Gillham (2008), interview questions must focus only on concerns that 
are essential to the investigation and cannot easily be discovered via other means, such as 
by observation or found in documentation.  Yin (2009) further noted that, in a case study, 
the interview questions must directly relate to the research questions being investigated.  
The author took these criteria into consideration when developing the interview 
questions.  The formal interview conducted before the performance of the risk assessment 
was used to provide the author with an understanding of the IS security risk situation at 
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GFU.  The formal interview conducted after the risk assessment was used to address each 
of the four research questions that formed the basis of this investigation.  The semi-
structured interview questions used for the pre-risk assessment interview can be found in 
Appendix C, whereas those used for the post-risk assessment interview are found in 
Appendix D.   
Interviews with GFU IT contacts were conducted both before and after the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment.  The information from initial interviews was used to create a 
baseline of the GFU IT staff’s understanding of the IS risk situation at GFU.  The 
information from the follow-up interview, through measuring the depth of knowledge 
gained by the risk assessment, was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment at GFU (Yin, 2009).   
Observations 
According to Yin (2009), collection of relevant data during a case study should 
include direct observations of behaviors and environmental conditions in the particular 
setting of the case study.  Gillham (2008) stated that observation is “the most direct way 
of obtaining data” (p. 46) for a case study, based on the fact that it entails observing what 
people actually do rather than what they say they do.  Accordingly, the author observed 
the risk assessment participant activities that formed the conduct of the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment process, by being present at group meetings and talking with participants 
during the completion of OCTAVE Allegro worksheets.  
Further, both Yin (2009) and Gillham (2008) recognize the benefits and challenges of 
being a participant-observer, rather than conducting observations in a structured and 
detached manner.  The nature of this case study required that the author be present during 
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the risk assessment activities and, thus, take on the role of a participant-observer.  
Gillham stated that participant observation is the usual way to perform observations in a 
case study.  Gillham noted that, although the observer’s presence will have an effect on 
the activities being performed, the impact on the case study findings can be minimized by 
the observer’s looking for “the probable influence of your presence” (p. 47).  Thus, in all 
observation settings, the author was aware of this “observer effect” (p. 47) and made 
notes in regard to possible effects on the risk assessment process and outcome. 
Scope of Risk Assessment 
Yin (2009) described the importance of defining specific time boundaries for the case 
study.  This case study began when the author met, on January 31, 2013, with GFU IT 
contacts to discuss the scope of the study and ended immediately after the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment had been completed, on May 23, 2013, on GFU’s most valuable 
IS asset, which is the data in their enterprise resource planning (ERP) system.  This study 
was not designed as a longitudinal study, as the long-term security benefits of conducting 
an IS risk assessment have been previously documented by Liu et al. (2009), Peltier 
(2010), and NIST JTF (2011).   
The author met with the GFU IT contacts to discuss the scope of the project, the 
timeline for the risk assessment, and the roles that each person would perform as well as 
to answer any questions they had.  A key component of the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment process is analyzing the risk for all existing IS assets, along with their value 
in accomplishing the mission of the organization (Caralli et al., 2007).  Risks are then 
prioritized according to the likelihood of occurrence and the amount of negative impact 
on the organization if the risk were realized.  Based on this prioritized list of risks to 
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assets, GFU risk assessment participants were able to decide on the most critical asset for 
which to develop a risk mitigation plan.  The case study research continued until the GFU 
IT staff completed the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment and produced a risk assessment 
report and mitigation plan for the single IS asset.  The information needed to address the 
research questions was available after the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment had been 
completed on one IS asset. 
 
The OCTAVE Allegro Process  
As described by Caralli et al. (2007), the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
methodology consists of four overall phases that are divided into eight steps.  The 
OCTAVE Allegro Documentation further divides the eight steps into one or more 
specific activities (Caralli et al., 2007).  The OCTAVE Allegro Documentation provides 
a clear explanation for the completion of the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets, which form 
the basis of the risk assessment. Completion of the worksheets formalizes the OCTAVE 
Allegro methodology into an easy-to-follow, repeatable process.  The case study at GFU 
followed these four phases, comprising eight steps, as presented in Figure 1. 
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   Phase 1        Phase 2      Phase 3     Phase 4 
 
Figure 1.  OCTAVE Allegro Roadmap (Caralli et al., 2007, p. 4). 
As noted above, according to Caralli et al. (2007), each of the eight steps that form the 
basis for the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment contains one or more specific activities.  
Each activity involves the completion of some part of the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets, 
which are provided in Appendix B of the OCTAVE Allegro documentation (“OCTAVE 
Allegro Worksheets v1.0”).  The completed OCTAVE Allegro worksheets constitute the 
final report of the risk assessment for GFU.  Table 2 provides an overview of the eight 
steps of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment methodology, with the activities 
performed in each step.  OCTAVE Allegro contains a total of ten worksheets.  Table 2 
also contains a list of each worksheet (or section thereof) under the activity in which it 
was completed during the risk assessment at GFU, as instructed in the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment methodology.  
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Table 2.  OCTAVE Allegro Steps, Activities, and Worksheets (Caralli et al., 2007) 
                 Step Activities & Worksheets 
Step 1: Establish Risk 
Measurement Criteria 
A1: Define risk measurement criteria 
Worksheets 1 thru 6 - one per organization 
A2: Prioritize the impact areas 
Worksheet 7 - one per organization 
Step 2: Develop an 
Information Asset Profile 
A1: Identify information assets 
A2: Focus on a few critical assets  
A3: Gather info about assets (rationale, description, 
owners, security requirements)  
Worksheet 8 - one per asset 
Step 3: Identify Information 
Asset Containers 
A1: Identify/Document Containers (technical, physical, 
people) 
Worksheet 9a, 9b, 9c - one per asset 
Step 4: Identify Areas of 
Concern 
A1: Threat concerns for each asset/container 
Worksheet 10 (sections 1-5) 
Step 5: Identify Threat 
Scenarios 
A1: Identify additional threats (technical, physical, 
people) 
 (Use Threat Scenarios Questionnaires: Appendix C) 
A2: Complete Info Asset Risk Worksheet 
Worksheet 10 (sections 1-5)  
A3: Add probability (optional) 
Worksheet 10 (section 6) 
Step 6: Identify Risks A1: Determine threat impact 
Worksheet 10 (section 7) 
Step 7: Analyze Risks A1: Evaluate consequence 
Worksheet 10 (section 8 - Value) 
A2: Compute relative risk score 
Worksheet 10 (section 8 - Score) 
Step 8: Select Mitigation 
Approach 
A1: Sort risks into categories  
A2: Assign mitigation approach (Mitigate, Defer, 
Accept, or Transfer) 
Worksheet 10 (section 9) 
A3: Mitigation strategy  
Worksheet 10 (end section) 
 
 
Phase 1: Establish Drivers 
Phase 1 of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU consisted of Step 1, 
“Establish Risk Measurement Criteria.”  This step involved establishing risk 
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measurement criteria by which to identify and prioritize the most significant security 
breach impact areas for GFU.  The risk measurement criteria constituted “a set of 
qualitative measures against which the effect of each risk on an organization’s mission 
and business objectives is evaluated” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. 32).  These criteria were 
prioritized from most to least important in terms of greatest potential negative threat 
impact to the GFU.  The security breach impact areas were meant to capture the most 
important business drivers for the GFU, including the institution’s reputation, financial 
health, productivity capacity, safety and health of employees and clients, and legal 
obligations (Caralli et al., 2007). 
Phase 2: Develop Asset Profile  
Phase 2 of the OCTAVE Allegro process consisted of Step 2, “Develop Information 
Asset Profile”, and Step 3, “Identify Information Asset Containers.”  Step 2 involved 
identifying and building a profile of GFU’s IS assets.  The asset profile included a 
description of each IS asset, the reason each asset was important to the organization, the 
owner of the asset, and the security requirements for the asset.  Step 3 entailed the 
identification of the locations (referred to as “containers”) of the information assets 
(Caralli et al., 2007).  Data asset containers comprise the IT devices in which each data 
asset was stored and transmitted, the physical locations where the data resided, and the 
names of individuals who had detailed knowledge of each data asset (Caralli et al., 2007).   
Phase 3: Identify Threats 
Phase 3 involved the identification of threats to GFU’s IS assets and comprised Step 4, 
“Identify Areas of Concern,” and Step 5, “Identify Threat Scenarios.”  This phase 
involved identifying possible IS asset threats that could be caused by individuals who 
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used technology or by physical events, either of which could have a negative impact on 
the integrity of GFU’s IS assets.  Physical threats to IS assets can be caused by problems 
with technology storage, transmission of the asset, or outside events such as adverse 
environmental mishaps (Caralli et al., 2007).  To capture this information effectively, 
Steps 4 and 5 required two distinct iterations of the threat identification process.  Step 4 
entailed the identification of areas of greatest threat concern based on previous 
knowledge or the perceptions of those who conducted the risk assessment.  Step 5 then 
involved performing a more methodical threat identification exercise using threat trees, 
which were created by filling out questionnaires provided in the OCTAVE Allegro 
documentation.  OCTAVE Allegro recognizes four areas of threats, which it represents as 
threat trees: human actors using technical means, human actors using physical access, 
technical problems, and other problems (such as natural disasters; Caralli et al., 2007).  
Phase 4: Identify and Mitigate Risks 
Phase 4 consisted of the final three steps and entailed the identification and mitigation 
of risks to GFU’s IS assets.  Step 6, “Identify Risks”, involved the identification of risks, 
which were determined by considering the consequences of threats being realized and the 
subsequent impact on IS assets (Caralli et al., 2007).  Step 7, “Analyze Risks”, was 
comprised of analyzing the identified risks using a simple quantitative method that 
prioritized risk based on the relative importance to the institution.  Once the risks were 
prioritized, Step 8, “Select Mitigation Approach”, was used to decide which risks needed 
to be mitigated immediately and which risks could be accepted or mitigation deferred 
until later. Risk mitigation strategies were then developed for the greatest organizational 
risks (Caralli et al., 2007).   
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Validity and Reliability 
According to Yin (2009), the quality of case studies can be judged by certain 
characteristics such as “trustworthiness, credibility, confirmability, and data 
dependability” (p. 40).  Yin described four tests that can be used to ascertain these 
characteristics: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.  With 
the exception of internal validity, each test is relevant and is presented in detail below.  
Internal validity is a concern only in explanatory case studies that attempt to establish a 
cause and effect and is not applicable to an exploratory case study, such as this 
investigation.  Nevertheless, the methodology used in this investigation accounted for 
internal validity by using a convergence of different data sources, such as interviews, 
observation, and documentation.   
Construct Validity 
Case study construct validity, as described by Yin (2009), is associated with 
conducting appropriate procedures for collecting and recording data.  Yin described three 
strategies that can increase the construct validity of the case study.  The first strategy is to 
use multiple sources of evidence, such as interviews, document review, and observations.  
The second is to follow a procedure that maintains the “chain of evidence” (p. 122).  
Maintaining a chain of evidence entails keeping records that are detailed to the degree 
that a subsequent researcher could determine the relationship between the data and the 
conclusions.  The third strategy is to allow respondents to review a draft copy of the 
results for the purpose of verification.  This ensures that keys facts have not been 
recorded incorrectly or inadvertently omitted.  During the data collection and report 
write-up, the author used these three strategies. 
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External Validity 
Yin (2009) stated that external validity concerns whether the results of a study are 
generalizable to similar situations.  According to Yin, the results of a single-case case 
study can be generalized beyond the immediate circumstances if the case is considered 
representative.  GFU was chosen as a representative case because it is considered by 
Shuman (2005) to be one of 12 typical small-sized universities in the U.S.  Thus, the risk 
assessment process at this typical small-sized university can be instructive for similarly-
sized institutions (Yin, 2009). 
To validate the external validity of this case study, the author gained the assistance of 
a number of risk assessment experts and practitioners (Appendix E).  These experts 
analyzed the procedures and results of the study to verify the validity of the findings and 
to determine the generalizability of the case study to other small- and medium-sized 
institutions.  
Reliability 
According to Yin (2009), increasing the reliability of a case study will help to 
minimize any errors in the research and to alleviate any bias of the investigator.  A case 
study can be viewed as reliable if a subsequent researcher could follow the same 
procedure and arrive at the same conclusions as found by the first investigator.  One 
method to increase the reliability of a case study, as noted by Yin, is for the investigator 
to maintain a database of evidence collected during the study.  The database serves as a 
repository for all data collected that is kept separate from the final report or conclusions 
drawn.  The author kept a database for this study, which included write-ups from 
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interviews and observations as well as copies of documents and archival records 
collected.   
 
Criteria for Interpreting Findings 
According to Tohidi (2011), a successful IS risk assessment enables an institution to 
prioritize the security controls that should be implemented, such as risk mitigation using 
technology or policies, risk transference using insurance, or risk avoidance.  Security 
controls must be prioritized to utilize limited company resources in the most cost-
effective manner.  Peltier (2010) noted that a successful IS security assessment will 
facilitate the identification of IS security concerns and the prioritization of vulnerabilities 
and ensure the selection of “an appropriate level of control or to accept the risk” (p. 5).  
Whitman and Mattord (2010) stated that one of the goals of the risk management process 
is to identify the vulnerabilities of information assets and “to rank them according to the 
need for protection” (p. 300).   
In his classic work on risk assessment, McCumber (2005) noted that, for the risk 
management process to be successful, it must be cost effective for the institution to 
perform.  Alberts and Dorofee (2003), in their classic work that defined the original 
OCTAVE method, stated that the tangible outcome of utilizing an effective risk 
assessment methodology is the assessment report that will guide and prioritize the 
security measures employed by an organization.  Thus, the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment at GFU was deemed successful, as it met budgetary requirements and  
provided adequate documentation for the prioritization of security concerns and risks and 
for the establishment of an effective IS risk mitigation plan (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003; 
Grajek, 2013; McCumber, 2005). 
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According to Yin (2009) and Creswell (2003), an important strategy for validating the 
findings of a qualitative study is to gather data from multiple sources.  Thus, the 
effectiveness of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology applied at GFU was validated by 
input from a variety of sources, including the IT staff at GFU, industry analysts who are 
experts at applying risk assessment methodologies, and the author’s analysis of the data.  
After the GFU IT staff conducted the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment, the author 
gathered data from the GFU participants via interviews to evaluate whether the risk 
assessment methodology was successful in their environment.  Responses were collected 
from GFU’s IT staff who participated in the risk assessment.   
The evaluation of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU was used to answer 
the four research questions that formed the framework for this investigation.  
Specifically, the study was evaluated as successful to the extent that answers to the 
following research questions (RQs) were obtained: 
RQ1.  GFU IT staff becomes sufficiently familiar with the OCTAVE Allegro 
methodology to be able to effectively conduct the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
(Appari & Johnson, 2010; Beachboard et al., 2008; Caralli et al., 2007).  
RQ2.  GFU IT staff gain an increased understanding of GFU’s IS assets, their 
importance to the mission of GFU, and the extent to which these assets must be protected 
(Caralli et al., 2007; Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Nikolic & Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2009).  
RQ3.  GFU IT staff gain an increased awareness of specific security concerns in 
regard to GFU’s IS assets, including threats, vulnerabilities, and risks (Caralli et al., 
2007; Liu et al., 2009; Peltier, 2010).  
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RQ4.  GFU IT staff demonstrate their skills in prioritizing IS risk management efforts 
for existing GFU IS assets (Caralli et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Peltier, 2010).   
After the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment was completed at GFU, the author 
developed a report, found in the following chapters of this study, that details the success 
of the risk assessment process based on the criteria set forth in the research questions 
above.  The benefits and limitations associated with the utilization of OCTAVE Allegro 
at GFU also are delineated.  
 
Format for Presenting Results 
Yin (2009) suggested that the results of a case study may be clearer to the reader if 
they are presented in a question-and-answer format.  In keeping with Yin’s 
recommendation, the author used a question-and-answer format for the presentation of 
the case study results, which allowed the author to present how the data gathered related 
to the propositions under examination.  Thus, the report includes a presentation of each 
research question, followed by a discussion of all applicable data and their meaning in 
terms of addressing the research question.  
 
Resources 
Pilot Site 
The researcher conducted the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment case study at GFU.  
Mr. Greg Smith, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) at GFU at the start of this research 
(who subsequently left employment at GFU), indicated to the author that his IT staff 
would invest the required time and resources to test the viability of the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment methodology (Appendix A).  GFU has approximately 20 IT staff 
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members, with one staff member designated as the CISO.  As noted, the CISO’s main 
title was Director of Administrative Computing and, thus, only part of his responsibilities 
included directing GFU’s IT security efforts (GFU, 2013b).  The CISO was involved in 
the initial planning meeting for the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU.  However, 
the CISO left GFU before the actual risk assessment project was initiated.   
Two participants performed the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU; both were 
male employees of the GFU IT department.  Although there was no acting CISO at GFU 
during the main part of this investigation, this did not substantially affect the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment.  The main participant who performed the risk assessment shared 
security responsibilities with the former CISO.  Further, the OCTAVE Allegro 
methodology does not require that the participants have prior risk management 
experience or knowledge for successful completion.  
Risk Assessment Experts 
To confirm that the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment was performed properly at 
GFU and that this research is generally applicable to other small-sized post-secondary 
institutions, the author obtained input from experts in implementation of OCTAVE 
Allegro and the risk assessment process.  The author contacted the security risk experts 
listed below, who provided input on the risk assessment process, research design, and 
guidelines for addressing the effectiveness of the risk assessment at GFU.  These 
individuals also commented on the extent to which the risk assessment results can benefit 
other small-sized post-secondary institutions, as indicated in Appendix E.   
• Lisa Young, co-author of the OCTAVE Allegro method and an employee of the 
CMU’s SEI. 
59 
 
 
 
• Steffani Burd, Ph.D., a risk management expert and author of the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s report on security in higher education, “The Impact of Information 
Security in Academic Institutions on Public Safety and Security” (National 
Criminal Justice Publication No. 215953; Burd, 2006). 
• Kathleen Roberts, Founder and Principal of iSecure Solutions, which specializes in 
performing risk assessments for small-sized colleges and universities. 
Software 
OCTAVE Allegro includes detailed worksheets that can be replicated to support 
performance of the IS risk assessment (Caralli et al., 2007).  Importantly, the CMU’s SEI 
has validated Digital Defense Inc.’s creation of the proprietary “Enterprise Risk 
Assessment Utility” (popularly referred to as the “ERA Utility”) software program as an 
electronic implementation of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment worksheets (Digital 
Defense Inc., 2009).  This software utility enables a user to electronically record the 
information collected during the risk assessment rather than to write the results on 
multiple printed forms.  Use of the ERA Utility expedites the paper management process 
and streamlines the procedures necessary for producing the final OCTAVE Allegro 
report.  The author attended the official OCTAVE Training course (SEI Training, 2013), 
where he obtained a copy of the ERA Utility software for implementation at GFU.  GFU 
used the ERA Utility to facilitate all data collection during the risk assessment process.  
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology that was used in this exploratory case study 
conducted at GFU.  To create a baseline of GFU’s IS security posture, security 
documentation and archival records were collected by the researcher prior to the 
commencement of the risk assessment.  Data also were collected from interviews of the 
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GFU IT staff and direct observations of the GFU IT staff as they conducted the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment.   
The performance of the risk assessment followed the four phases, composed of eight 
steps, of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology, as described by Caralli et al. (2007).  To 
ensure the validity and reliability of the case study, the author followed various practices, 
as described by Yin (2009), including the use of multiple sources of data, comprised of 
interviews, documentation, and observations, to corroborate research findings.  Construct 
validity was strengthened by maintaining a connection between the data collected and the 
conclusions drawn.  The author allowed key GFU IT staff to view a draft copy of the case 
study to ensure that key facts were included.  External validity was maintained by 
allowing risk assessment experts, including Lisa Young, Steffani Burd, and Kathleen 
Roberts, to review the findings.  Finally, to ensure reliability, the author maintained a 
database of all evidence collected during the case study. 
To determine the success of this investigation, the findings of the GFU risk assessment 
were used to address the research questions.  The author believes that the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment was sufficiently easy for GFU IT staff to understand and conduct 
and that the completion of the risk assessment provided GFU with a better understanding 
of their IS assets as well as enabled them to create effective risk mitigation plans and to 
prioritize their IS security spending.  The results of this investigation are presented below 
in a question-and-answer format.  Specifically, the report of this investigation includes a 
presentation of each research question, followed by a discussion of all applicable data and 
their meaning in terms of addressing the research question. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of this investigation.  The chapter 
begins with an overview of the data collection process, including a change that occurred 
in the GFU IT department that affected the resources available for conducting the risk 
assessment.  Then, detailed findings from the risk assessment case study are presented in 
a question-and-answer format as they relate to the four research questions.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the results.   
As noted, Yin (2009) and Gillham (2008) stated the importance of collecting various 
types of evidence for a case study, including relevant documents, archival records, notes 
from observations, and answers from formal and informal interviews.  Each of these 
types of data was collected before, during, and after the risk assessment process, as 
detailed below.  The initial data collected before the start of the risk assessment formed 
the baseline of the IS risk investigation at GFU against which to compare the data 
collected at the end of the study.   
To ensure the construct validity of this study (Yin, 2009), the two GFU risk 
assessment participants were given a draft copy of these results to verify that what was 
recorded in the results represented their situation accurately.  After reading this report, 
Participant 2 (who acted as the interim Director of Administrative Computing) validated 
the accuracy of data gathered during the risk assessment process and stated that it was a 
fair assessment of the security situation at GFU. 
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At the start of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment investigation, the author created 
a baseline of the initial IT security situation at GFU.  This baseline was created from 
information gathered during the initial meeting with GFU IT contacts, by conducting a 
formal pre-assessment interview, gathering all existing IT security documents, and 
collecting IT security archival reports.  During the risk assessment, the author took 
detailed notes based on direct observations of the risk assessment process, viewed 
documents produced by the participants during the risk assessment project, and 
conducted informal interviews with the two risk assessment participants.  At the end of 
the project, the author conducted a formal post-assessment interview with Participant 1, 
who performed the majority of the risk assessment. The author also collected 
documentation related to the project, including copies of completed OCTAVE Allegro 
worksheets.  Due to confidentiality concerns at GFU, these documents are not included in 
this investigative report. 
According to Yin (2009), the preferred strategy for analyzing case study evidence is to 
rely on the theoretical propositions that formed the basis of the study.  Yin also stated that 
the results of the case study can be presented in a question-and-answer format, which 
allows the author to organize the data according to the propositions that are being 
examined in the study.  Thus, the author presented and analyzed the data collected in this 
investigation according to their relationship to the research questions. 
As the risk assessment project was to begin, two of GFU’s senior IT managers left 
GFU to take positions at other institutions, which left GFU without a CIO or a Director of 
Administrative Computing (who also held the title of CISO).  Inasmuch as the existing 
staff filled in for two staff members, the remaining GFU employees could not commit the 
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full amount of time to the risk assessment project, as originally planned.  Nevertheless, 
GFU IT staff and senior management wanted to move forward with this investigation.  
The IT staff and senior management understood the importance of performing a risk 
assessment of IS assets but were able to do only a scaled-back version of the project.  The 
acting IT managers decided that GFU’s IT staff could dedicate a total of only 40 hours of 
the network administrator’s time, over a period of two weeks.  GFU IT staff completed as 
much of the risk assessment as could be done in that time, and used this project to 
determine how useful OCTAVE Allegro could be to GFU as a long-term component of 
their IT security efforts and reporting mechanisms.  The network administrator chosen to 
perform the bulk of the risk assessment had worked at GFU for approximately 14 years. 
This individual is referred to in this report as Participant 1.  This individual had a good 
understanding of the network, IS assets, and GFU computer users’ needs.   
 
Results Related to RQ1  
     The first RQ is, To what extent is the OCTAVE Allegro methodology sufficiently 
straightforward for the IT staff at GFU to understand and conduct?  The results related to 
this question are presented in the material that follows. 
The Baseline Situation 
The first topic addressed through an analysis of the case study data is the extent to 
which the OCTAVE Allegro methodology was sufficiently straightforward for the IT 
staff at GFU to understand and conduct.  GFU IT participants stated that, before the risk 
assessment case study project started, their IT staff had no previous knowledge of or 
experience with the OCTAVE Allegro method and very little knowledge of any risk 
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assessment methods.  In the initial interview, GFU IT contacts said that GFU’s IT staff 
had not previously performed an IS risk assessment.   
Initial Training 
The amount of training received by GFU IT participants before the start of the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment project was minimal.  Participant 1 stated that, before 
the project started, he spent about four or five hours reading about OCTAVE Allegro, 
reviewing online documentation of how other people had used OCTAVE Allegro, 
glancing through the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation (Caralli et al., 2007), and twice 
listening to an 18-minute podcast by Lisa Young (Young & Allen, 2008), which provided 
an introduction to the OCTAVE Allegro method and how it can be used in organizations.  
He noted that he was trying to get the overall picture of how a risk assessment could be 
used in their environment but that the podcast did not give him particular knowledge of 
the specifics of applying the OCTAVE Allegro methodology.  He also stated that he did 
not read any parts thoroughly.  As noted, “Introducing OCTAVE Allegro: Improving the 
Information Security Risk Assessment Process” by Caralli et al. (2007) was the SEI 
document that introduced OCTAVE Allegro and provided an explanation of how to 
perform a risk assessment using this methodology.  
At the start of the risk assessment project, the author met with the two GFU risk 
assessment participants and spent about two hours with them, providing informal 
training.  The training consisted of their reading the appendices of the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation and the author’s providing information as needed.  Each of the eight steps 
of the OCTAVE Allegro process includes one or more activities, and each is explained in 
detail in the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation Appendix A (“OCTAVE Allegro Method 
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Guidance v1.0”).  Every OCTAVE Allegro activity involves the completion of a certain 
section of one of the ten OCTAVE Allegro worksheets.  The worksheets are found in the 
OCTAVE Allegro Documentation Appendix B (“OCTAVE Allegro Worksheets v1.0”).  
The relationship between the eight OCTAVE Allegro steps and the ten worksheets are 
presented in Table 2, above.  A printout of Table 2 was given to each risk assessment 
participant during the informal training session.  
During the initial informal training, for each of the eight steps, the author and the two 
risk assessment participants first read the explanation found in the OCTAVE Allegro 
Method Guidance v1.0, which describes the different activities related to the step.  The 
participants then looked at the corresponding worksheet(s) in the OCTAVE Allegro 
Worksheets v1.0, followed by reading the completed worksheet examples found in the 
OCTAVE Allegro Documentation Appendix D (OCTAVE Allegro Example Worksheets 
v1.0).  (When the participants read about Step 5, the participants briefly looked at the 
questionnaires found in Appendix C of the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation [OCTAVE 
Allegro Questionnaires v1.0], which are meant to simplify the Activities in that step.)  
The participants followed this process for each of the eight steps, reading the OCTAVE 
Allegro Method Guidance v1.0, while looking at the OCTAVE Allegro Worksheets v1.0 
and then viewing the corresponding examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Example 
Worksheets v1.0.   
As noted above, Step 1 entailed the establishment of risk measurement criteria for 
GFU.  Before the start of the risk assessment project, Lisa Young (co-author of the 
OCTAVE Allegro Documentation) gave the author some additional information to help 
with Step 1 of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment (Appendix F).  Young suggested 
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that GFU try to make the risk measurement criteria as quantitative as possible, setting 
numeric thresholds to separate the low-, medium-, and high-risk measurement categories.  
She also said that experience has taught that it is best to set “Teaching Time” as another 
risk management criterion for institutions of higher education (in the User Defined 
category, Worksheet 6).  The author presented an overview of these further instructions 
to the GFU risk assessment participants during the informal training process and 
distributed a printed copy of Young’s email so that this information could be 
incorporated into the risk assessment project.   
Based on this training, the GFU IT contacts started to engage in Step 1 of OCTAVE 
Allegro, filling out Worksheets 1 through 7.  During this process, the author pointed out 
that it would be helpful to look at the examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Example 
Worksheets v1.0 to understand specifically what was expected in completing Step 1 
activities.  Thus, the two risk assessment participants decided to fill out Worksheets 1 
through 7 to the best of their knowledge.  The participants set categories and suggested 
dollar amounts and percentages but realized that it would be important to obtain input 
from the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), who also was the acting CIO, to accurately fill in 
dollar amounts and complete the prioritization required on Worksheet 7.   
Formal and Informal Interviews 
The day after the informal training, the author asked each GFU risk assessment 
participant how easy they felt OCTAVE Allegro was to understand and use, based on 
what they had seen so far.  Participant 1 said that it looked fairly easy to use.  Participant 
2 stated that OCTAVE Allegro seemed pretty straightforward, based on what he had 
seen.  There were no areas that caused him concern or that seemed too difficult to 
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understand.  He stated that the documentation seemed to have the appropriate amount of 
detail to enable someone to walk through all the major steps of the risk assessment.   
In a formal interview after the risk assessment was complete, Participant 1 was asked 
how understandable he found OCTAVE Allegro to be and what parts he found difficult to 
understand.  Participant 1 responded that it was fairly understandable and that it was very 
helpful to see the examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Example Worksheets v1.0.  He said 
that his understanding of the whole process would most likely have been significantly 
harder without having the examples to view.  These examples helped this respondent 
understand the purpose of each activity. 
Observations 
Throughout the risk assessment process, Participant 1 often demonstrated that he was 
able to understand the OCTAVE Allegro process fairly easily, based on reading the 
explanation of the activities and viewing the examples in the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation.  Notably, immediately after reading the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation, the two risk assessment participants started entering information in 
Worksheets 1 through 7, as noted.  Another example of their understanding was seen 
when the participants began Steps 2 and 3 for the OCTAVE Allegro process.  After 
Participant 1 reviewed the OCTAVE Allegro Method Guidance v1.0 of the OCTAVE 
Allegro Documentation and viewed the examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Example 
Worksheets v1.0, he was able to immediately start completing the worksheets.  When 
Participant 1 would have questions about what a particular item meant, he would go back 
to review the examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Example Worksheets v1.0; this often put 
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him back on course, when he started to go off course, and answered any questions that he 
had.   
Another demonstration of the straightforward and understandable nature of the 
OCTAVE Allegro instructions was when the participants were called upon to describe 
the process to others.  According to the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation, the 
information recorded in Step 1 (Worksheets 1 through 7) should reflect the risk tolerance 
levels of the university’s management team.  Thus, during the first week of the risk 
assessment, the participants met with the CFO to complete OCTAVE Allegro 
Worksheets 1 through 7.  The participants had previously completed these sheets so that 
they would be ready for the CFO to fill in specific dollar amounts and percentages.  To 
start the meeting, Participant 2 explained that levels of risk were to be established for the 
university, based on risk factors such as reputation or financial costs, as shown in the 
worksheets.  The CFO readily understood the intention of the exercise and immediately 
began to fill in percentages and dollar amounts for low-, medium-, and high-risk factors 
for each category.  Near the end of the meeting, the CFO asked whether the prioritization 
in Worksheet 7 was about university-wide priorities or just for the IT department.  When 
neither of the two GFU participants offered to answer, the author clarified that these 
priorities were for the whole university and explained that, if GFU’s Risk Department 
already had established risk priorities, those could be used instead of this OCTAVE 
Allegro worksheet.   
Near the end of the of the risk assessment project, another opportunity arose for 
Participant 1 to explain the OCTAVE Allegro process, which demonstrated how well he 
understood the entire method.  The final step of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
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(Step 8) required that priorities be set for different IS asset risks.  Participant 1 had been 
performing the day-to-day activities of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment but wanted 
Participant 2’s input during this prioritization process.  To explain the results of the risk 
assessment up until that point, Participant 1 gave an overview of the entire OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment process and explained how input was needed for Step 8.  Based 
on the author’s observation, he appeared to give an accurate overview of the process 
without needing input from any documentation.  Participant 1 then explained to 
Participant 2 that, during the risk assessment, they had only one threat identified per 
asset.  However, if GFU’s IT staff took time to complete more threat scenario 
worksheets, the assessment would show multiple threats listed for each IS asset.  Having 
multiple threats documented would provide a more complete picture of GFU’s risk 
situation and aid in their security decision making and prioritization.   
Documentation 
GFU’s IT participants’ ability to understand the OCTAVE Allegro process was 
demonstrated by their ability to produce a complete and meaningful risk assessment final 
report within a very short timeframe.  The clearly delineated activities related to each step 
as detailed in the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation allowed the participants to read, 
understand, and focus on one task at a time, filling in the information required for each of 
the successive worksheets.  This process allowed participants to incrementally produce a 
finalized risk assessment report.   
 
Results Related to RQ2 
     The second RQ is, To what extent will conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment help GFU IT staff to identify existing IS assets and classify them in order of 
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importance to the mission of the organization?  The results related to this question are 
presented in the material that follows. 
The Baseline Situation 
The second topic to be addressed by an analysis of the case study data is the extent to 
which conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment helped GFU IT staff to identify 
existing IS assets and to classify them in order of importance to the mission of their 
organization.  In the pre-risk assessment interview, the GFU IT contacts stated that the IT 
staff did not keep a list of their IS data assets or maintain documentation on which 
computer systems stored or transmitted these assets.  GFU’s IT department controls and 
maintains the systems on which all IS assets are stored, monitors access to these data, and 
supports faculty and staff who use these IS assets.  Thus, the GFU IT staff knows which 
assets exist and where they were stored and processed in general terms, and has an 
intuitive feel for their value to the organization, but this was not formally documented.  
Each IT staff member works with different IS assets and systems and, thus, would have 
more knowledge about some IS assets and less about others.  There was no 
comprehensive view of GFU’s IS assets, how they were stored and transmitted, or their 
value to the organization. 
Formal Interview 
In the post-risk assessment interview, Participant 1 was asked whether he felt that the 
OCTAVE Allegro process helped him to identify existing IS Assets.  Having worked in 
the IT department at GFU for 14 years, Participant 1 felt that the OCTAVE Allegro 
process did not substantially help him understand what IS assets existed, as he already 
was familiar with them.  He did note, however, that it was helpful to talk to the data asset 
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owners about how each asset was used.  After a number of conversations with data asset 
owners, Participant 1 realized that he had an incomplete view of the IS assets from the 
perspective of who accessed the data, where the data were accessed from, the devices 
used to access and store the data, the full extent of their security requirements, and what 
security controls were already in place.  The OCTAVE Allegro process helped him to 
achieve a more comprehensive view of the IS data assets. 
Participant 1 also was asked, in the post-risk assessment interview, whether the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment helped him to classify the IS assets in terms of 
importance to the organization.  He stated that he already knew the importance of the 
assets and, thus, the risk assessment did not substantially help in that regard.  He did, 
however, gain valuable insights from interviews with the data owners with whom he 
spoke.  He did not interview all IS asset owners, as he ran out of time for the project.  He 
thought that, if he did interviews with all the data owners, this would have brought out 
valuable information as to the importance and value of the different IS assets.   
Informal Interviews 
The author’s informal talks with Participant 1 during the risk assessment provided 
insight into how the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment helped to identify the details of 
GFU’s IS assets, such as the security requirements for each data asset.  On the second day 
of the risk assessment, Participant 1 spent time filling out Worksheet 8 for Step 2, which 
entailed the development of an Information Asset Profile.  Although Participant 1 was 
able to complete much of the worksheet from information he already knew, on the third 
day of the risk assessment, he had still not completed Worksheet 8 for all assets; he said 
that he wanted to talk to more of the data owners to obtain a better understanding of the 
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security requirements for different assets.  After talking with the various data owners, 
Participant 1 was able to complete that section of the Information Asset Profile. 
Other conversations with Participant 1 confirmed that performing the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment helped him to identify the containers in which the data assets are 
stored, processed, and transmitted.  On the third day of the risk assessment, Participant 1 
started working on Step 3 (Worksheet 9), which involved identifying the containers of 
each IS asset.  After working on this for about two hours, Participant 1 realized that he 
needed to talk to the owners of various data assets to obtain a better understanding of the 
containers in which data were stored and processed.  After each conversation, he was able 
to complete more of the Information Asset Profile and, thus, obtain a more complete view 
of the data assets. 
The process of documenting detailed information about each IS data asset proved to be 
helpful in identifying data ownership and responsibility.  For instance, in documenting 
the data assets (Worksheet 8), Participant 1 realized that, as far as he knew, the 
responsibility for compliance to the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 
DSS) for some of their data was not clearly delineated.  Participant 1 noted that this 
responsibility for PCI DSS compliance was something that needed to be addressed. 
Observations 
Participant 1 wrote down most of GFU’s important IS assets from memory.  Although 
Participant 1 knew all the GFU IS assets that existed within IT’s control, in the process of 
remembering and capturing all this information in the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets, he 
had to go through a brainstorming process.  While working to write down all of the 
important IS assets, Participant 1 looked through the administrative department areas on 
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the GFU public website.  The website helped Participant 1 realize that he had forgotten to 
include the GFU email system and the student health information data in the list of IS 
assets.  He eventually identified a total of ten different IS assets.   
After Participant 1 had identified these ten IS assets, he gave them an informal 
ranking, based on his perception of which were most important to the university.  He 
quickly came up with five different levels of importance and placed the data assets in 
these categories.  Three of the IS assets were placed in category one, indicating that these 
assets were the most important to GFU.   
Documentation 
The tangible output from the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment at GFU was a report 
that consisted of the completed OCTAVE Allegro Worksheets.  Included in this report 
was a detailed list of all IS data assets as well as descriptions of how the data were used, 
who owned the data, the security requirements for the data, and where the data assets 
were stored, processed, and transmitted.  Due to the participants’ completing the 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment, GFU now possesses a comprehensive description of 
their IS assets, which includes written security requirements, something that did not 
previously exist in written form. 
 
Results Related to RQ3 
The third RQ is, To what extent will conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
help GFU IT staff to identify and evaluate IS security concerns, including threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks in regard to existing IS assets?  The results related to this 
question are presented in the material that follows. 
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The Baseline Situation 
The findings presented here concern the extent to which conducting the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment helped GFU IT staff to identify and evaluate IS security 
concerns, including threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, in regard to existing IS assets.  In 
the author’s initial meeting with GFU IT staff, the CISO said that GFU’s IT staff plan 
and operate their IT security-related activities intuitively; the IT department has no 
methodology in place to objectively validate the need for GFU’s IT security operations.  
Based on an initial look at OCTAVE Allegro, the CISO was excited about what the risk 
assessment could do for GFU’s IT department in terms providing a formal method to 
validate GFU’s security-related IT efforts.   
The CISO also said, in the initial meeting, that GFU did not have a written security 
response document.  The IT staff did have an informal plan and understanding of the 
steps that they follow when confronting a possible security breach, but these steps were 
not documented.  Most of the IT staff has worked at GFU for many years, and IT 
management has a high level of trust in their IT employees and believes that GFU’s IT 
staff members all have a good understanding of GFU’s informal security processes.  
Nevertheless, the IT staff hoped to document their security response process at some 
point. 
In the pre-risk assessment interview, the GFU IT staff members stated that the IT 
department seldom did any type of vulnerability analysis or scan of IT assets.  IT staff 
members would run a vulnerability scan only if there were a specific reason to do so, for 
example, if their network monitoring tool indicated that there were some open Internet 
Protocol (IP) ports on a piece of equipment such as a printer.  The IT staff members also 
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indicated that GFU did not regularly perform penetration testing or have a process for 
calculating IS asset vulnerability and risk.   
GFU IT staff keeps a spreadsheet that lists reported or known security incidents.  The 
list includes a description of the incident or problem, who was involved, what equipment 
was involved, the security team that handled the incident, and what the resolution was.  
As of May 1, 2013, the spreadsheet included 26 incidents, ranging from June 24, 2010, to 
April 26, 2013.  Many of the incidents included unwanted incoming or outgoing traffic 
from open IP ports on computers or other equipment.  There were a number of denial-of-
service attacks against the GFU Newberg Campus.  There were various other incidents 
that included employees’ emailing employee social security numbers in plaintext, 
requests to access an employee’s email account, and reports of publicly listed passwords 
as well as stolen computers.   
Formal Interview 
In the post-risk assessment interview, Participant 1 stated that the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment would have been very useful for identifying and evaluating IS security 
concerns if the participants had spent more time on Phase 3 of the assessment (Identify 
Threats).  As it was, the participants mostly identified and documented threats and 
vulnerabilities of which GFU’s IT staff were already aware, based on the limited amount 
of time that the participants had to spend on the risk assessment project.  GFU’s IT staff 
members did not use this iteration of the risk assessment mainly as a tool to identify other 
threats but, rather, to validate OCTAVE Allegro’s usefulness as a security tool for GFU.  
The participants are aware that there are other threats that were not completely addressed 
by this risk assessment.  For instance, at one point in the risk assessment process, the 
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GFU participants mentioned that they were unaware of whether paper copies of student 
information were being properly protected; this potential risk has not yet been addressed 
or documented.   
Informal Interviews 
Various conversations during the risk assessment project shed light on the value of 
OCTAVE Allegro in terms of helping to identify IS threats and analyze their risks.  Near 
the end of the risk assessment, Participant 1 noted that it had helped to have a structured 
method such as OCTAVE Allegro to use when considering vulnerabilities and threats.  
He stated that it created a more in-depth view of various issues, as it provided methodical 
steps with which to conduct risk identification.  For instance, Participant 1 said that 
having the different Impact Areas (Worksheets 1-7) listed right in front of him was a 
good reminder to think through possible threats from areas that he had not previously 
considered.  As an example, he mentioned “reputation” (Impact Area) as it related to 
GFU’s Learning Management System (LMS).   
The risk assessment process made Participant 1 realize that GFU IT staff needed to 
consider not only GFU’s reputation external to their organization but also GFU’s 
reputation among the GFU faculty.  GFU’s LMS was initially met with much faculty 
uncertainty, and faculty buy-in and adoption took a long time.  If a student were able to 
breach the system and change student grades, this would significantly damage GFU’s 
reputation in regard to the LMS, both externally and internally. 
Further, Participant 1 said that, when he was going through Step 5, identifying threat 
scenarios by answering the questions found in the OCTAVE Allegro Questionnaires 
v1.0, he was made aware that he had been thinking only of threats that were possible by 
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exploiting technical containers, not threats caused by people.  The questionnaires made 
the participant aware of vulnerabilities of IS assets through people and the processes that 
were used to access the asset.  Participant 1 realized that GFU needs to address the risks 
that arise through people and processes involved in the information system.    
Another example of the risk assessment participants’ becoming aware of threats from 
non-technical containers was seen during the completion of Step 4.  When brainstorming 
threat concerns in Step 4, GFU participants realized that certain departments most likely 
had paper copies of personal information of students that would be subject to Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) regulations.  Other departments most likely 
had written medical information about students that would be subject to Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations.  The OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment made GFU participants aware of the vulnerabilities that exist through these 
physical containers (i.e., on paper).   
After conducting some interviews and completing questionnaires from the OCTAVE 
Allegro Questionnaires v1.0, Participant 1 stated that, in working through Step 5 of 
OCTAVE Allegro (meant to help identify threat scenarios), he realized that there is an 
unspoken expectation in the GFU IT department that each person should keep security in 
mind as he or she is working in his or her own area.  Participant 1 felt, however, that a 
very small percentage of the employees in their department actually considered security 
in their respective areas of responsibility.  Using a structured method for risk assessment 
helped to highlight areas in need of being addressed.   
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Observations 
Although GFU risk assessment participants felt that GFU IT staff members already 
had a fair understanding of the major threats and vulnerabilities of their most important 
IS assets, the author observed that, when working to complete the first part of the 
Information Asset Risk Worksheet (Worksheet 10), Participant 1 was looking at the 
OCTAVE Allegro Example Worksheets v1.0 to understand the fields such as Actor, 
Means, Motive, and Outcome for each identified threat.  This exercise provided more 
detail about each threat than the GFU IT staff had previously considered.   
Documentation 
The final report produced as a result of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
consisted of the completed OCTAVE Allegro Worksheets.  Normally there are multiple 
instances of the Information Asset Risk Worksheet (Worksheet 10) for each IS asset, as 
the risk assessment process requires participants to complete this worksheet for each 
threat scenario identified.  Due to the constrained timeframe for the GFU risk assessment 
project, participants only completed Worksheet 10 for the one main threat scenario that 
they could easily identify for each of their IS assets; the participants did not complete the 
worksheet for all threat scenarios that were identified.  However, in completing some of 
the OCTAVE Allegro Questionnaires v1.0, GFU participants identified numerous 
possible threat scenarios other than the ones of which they were previously aware.  By 
going back to these questionnaires, GFU IT staff would be able to delineate other threats 
and risks that were previously overlooked. 
Another valuable piece of information that was collected in the risk assessment 
process (and was included in the final OCTAVE Allegro report) was a qualitative 
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measure of the probability of a threat’s being realized.  Step 5 concerns the optional 
activity of assigning a perceived qualitative probability for the identified threat scenario.  
“Because it is often very difficult to accurately quantify probability (especially with 
respect to security vulnerabilities and events), probability is expressed in this risk 
assessment qualitatively as high, medium, or low” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. 52).  GFU 
participants chose to add this optional probability to all identified threats, which was 
reflected in the final risk assessment report.  Assigning a probability to each threat gave 
GFU one more measure by which to evaluate risks related to their IS assets.    
For the analysis of the identified threats, Worksheet 10 also included a relative risk 
score, a quantitative value that represented the seriousness of the potential impact if the 
risk is realized.  This relative risk score was derived from priorities that GFU identified 
earlier in the risk assessment process and provided a quantitative number by which to 
compare the impact of all identified risks.  This quantitative number meant nothing by 
itself; it was meant only to provide a value with which to rate one risk against other 
identified risks.  With the final OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment report, GFU obtained a 
more objective and quantitative measure by which to evaluate their security-related 
activities, rather than merely their intuition and experience, as was the case before the 
risk assessment project.   
 
Results Related to RQ4 
     The fourth RQ is, To what extent will the completion of a risk assessment using the 
OCTAVE Allegro methodology provide adequate information for GFU IT staff to 
prioritize the security measures that should be employed to secure their IS assets?  The 
results related to this question are presented in the material that follows. 
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The Baseline Situation 
The final question to consider was the extent to which the completion of the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment provided adequate information for GFU IT staff to prioritize the 
security measures that should be employed to secure their IS assets.  At the start of the 
risk assessment project, GFU had no method for prioritizing security-related activities or 
an objective way to validate which security projects get funded.  In an initial meeting 
with the author, the GFU IT contacts said that they did their security planning and 
operations intuitively, without confirmation by an objective method.  In a formal 
interview before the risk assessment project, GFU participants verified this by indicating 
that security concerns were addressed as they arose within their environment, such as a 
denial-of-service attack on one of their network segments or servers.   
As an example of how security-related priorities were set based on intuition and 
perceived cost, rather than following a structured method, the CFO commented on how 
GFU was checking into purchasing identity theft insurance to help transfer the risk of 
data breaches that might involve student data.  GFU staff members were waiting to 
receive a quote for the cost of the insurance; the CFO said that knowing the cost could 
help in setting risk priorities.  This belief was echoed by the outgoing CISO, who 
mentioned that he had a good idea about what the most important security-related issue 
might be, based on the expense of purchasing identity protection for all users if a data 
breach did occur.  However, because the costs of all potential risks were not being 
considered, it would not be known whether there was a different risk that might have a 
greater impact on GFU.   
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Formal and Informal Interviews 
When the risk assessment participants were asked whether they found the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment useful to prioritize GFU security measures to secure their IS 
assets, Participant 1 said that it, indeed, was helpful.  He specifically mentioned that 
setting a probability to the threats (in Step 5) helped give him a “three-dimensional view” 
of the threat scenarios; this substantially enhanced his understanding of the risks that 
were analyzed.  Participant 1 mentioned that it would have been significantly more 
helpful if participants would have identified more threats and vulnerabilities for each 
asset but were unable to do so, based on time constraints for the risk assessment project.   
During the final step of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment (Step 8, Select 
Mitigation Approach), Participant 1 created a relative risk matrix for the identified 
threats, which illustrated the importance of threats based on their relative risk score and 
the probabilities calculated in earlier steps.  Participant 2 commented that it was nice to 
have this risk matrix to view and to compare IS risks in a way that GFU IT staff had not 
previously considered, rather than just repeating what the participants already knew from 
the outset of the risk assessment project.   
Observations 
Step 8 (Activity 1) of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment included instructions for 
the participant to prioritize the identified threats using a combination of their relative risk 
score and probability.  The OCTAVE Allegro Method Guidance v1.0 provided an 
illustration of a Relative Risk Matrix as an example of using both risk score and 
probability to prioritize risks.  On seeing this, Participant 1 was able to improvise and 
produce a prioritized view of threats in the matrix, using an element that showed GFU’s 
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relative risk score on a linear scale within the matrix (Appendix G).  This was an 
improvised view of GFU’s identified risks; producing this chart showed that GFU is 
equipped with a risk-prioritization tool that GFU IT staff did not previously possess.  
GFU risk assessment participants were able to use this relative risk matrix to prioritize IS 
risks that had been identified and to decide whether to mitigate, defer, or accept the risk 
associated with each threat.   
Documentation 
The completed worksheets produced by participants of the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment provided GFU with a detailed view of their IS assets and thorough 
documentation for each identified threat.  The final steps in the risk assessment required 
that participants decide whether they would mitigate a particular risk, accept the risk, or 
defer the decision to mitigate.  Decisions were made based predominantly on the relative 
risk matrix that the participants produced earlier.  The risk matrix was able to provide 
GFU IT staff with the information that was needed to prioritize GFU’s security-related 
activities, and GFU IT staff members now have a list of threats and decisions for 
handling the associated risks.  The final activity for the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment (Step 8, Activity 3) required the participants to detail the mitigation steps that 
IT staff would take for the risks that they decided to mitigate.  This process provided 
GFU IT staff with a clear plan for employing certain security measures to protect their IS 
assets.   
The GFU IT staff was already working on implementing mitigation solutions for some 
of the risks that were identified during the risk assessment process.  This was due to the 
fact that, with their limited timeframe for the assessment, the participants listed only one 
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major threat scenario per IS asset, many of which GFU IT staff were already aware.   
However, the IT staff now has documentation that details the various aspects and 
consequences of these risks, a way to objectively prioritize these risks, and a tool to 
objectively justify which security projects are most important, which GFU IT staff 
previously did not have.   
 
Summary 
This chapter reported the results of the data as they related to each research question 
that formed the basis for this investigation.  Data were collected by the author from 
different sources, including documentation, interviews, and observations.  These multiple 
sources of data provided a convergence of evidence to answer the four research questions 
(Gillham, 2008; Yin, 2009).  In summary, OCTAVE Allegro proved to be easy for GFU 
risk assessment participants to understand and conduct.  Performing the risk assessment 
provided GFU IT staff with a more complete view of the details and security 
requirements of their IS assets.  The process also helped GFU participants to identify 
threats and provided an objective method for prioritizing GFU IS security-related 
projects.   
GFU IT staff previously planned their security-related measures and operations based 
on their intuition and experiences.  GFU did not utilize a structured method to validate IS 
security concerns or an objective process to prioritize IS-related security projects. 
Although GFU performed an abridged version of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
based on a limited timeframe for completion, the process proved valuable for providing 
an objective view of GFU’s risk environment and a repeatable process by which to 
evaluate security concerns and IT security projects.  The GFU IT staff would like to build 
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OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment information into a regular part of their reporting 
process, as they see the importance of having a structured risk assessment process drive 
GFU’s security decisions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusions, implications, recommendations, and summary 
of this investigation.  The chapter begins with the conclusions that were developed based 
on the results of this research, particularly as they pertain to the four research questions.  
This is followed by a presentation of the implications of the results in terms of their 
impact on the investigation of risk management and how it contributes to the professional 
practice of risk assessments in higher education.  Then, recommendations for future 
research are provided, followed by a summary of this investigation.  
As noted in the methodology section, throughout this research process, the author 
obtained input from experts in the implementation of OCTAVE Allegro and other risk 
assessment methods.  Although all feedback received from these experts confirmed the 
results and conclusions of this investigation, the comments by Lisa Young, co-author of 
the OCTAVE Allegro methodology (Caralli et al., 2007), are especially worthy of note 
(Appendix H).  Young confirmed that the findings of this report were valid in that they 
provided GFU with a more holistic view of risks to their IS assets.  Young also stated that 
the findings of this investigation are generalizable to other small institutions of higher 
education.  
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Conclusions 
As noted above, the research was structured around four research questions.  The 
following conclusions are based on analysis of the case study results as they pertain to 
each research question.    
Conclusions Related to RQ1 
The first RQ is, To what extent is the OCTAVE Allegro methodology sufficiently 
straightforward for the IT staff at GFU to understand and conduct?  Based on the results, 
it became evident that the OCTAVE Allegro method was easy for the GFU IT staff to 
understand and implement.  The GFU participants had no previous knowledge of risk 
assessment methods and had never performed an IS risk assessment.  Within a couple of 
hours, the GFU participants were able to read the pertinent parts of the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation (the appendices).  With this degree of training and understanding, the 
participants were able to start completing the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets, which form 
the substance of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment method.  GFU IT staff did not 
need formal training or supplemental written material to grasp the activities related to 
each step of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment process.  Based on merely reading the 
documentation, the participants were able to complete a first iteration of the entire 
OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment within a couple weeks.   
Conclusions Related to RQ2 
The second RQ is, To what extent did conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment help GFU IT staff identify existing IS assets and classify them in order of 
importance to the mission of the organization?  The OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
helped GFU to gain a more comprehensive view of their IS assets and to better 
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understand the security requirements associated with each asset.  GFU had no centralized 
or formal written list of their IS assets.  Although GFU IT staff were already aware of the 
university’s important IS assets, the risk assessment process provided an opportunity to 
create formal documentation of their IS assets, including a description of each asset, why 
it was important to the university, and its data owner.  Further, in talking to data owners 
to collect the information required by the OCTAVE Allegro Information Asset Profile, 
participants gained a better understanding of where the IS asset was stored and processed, 
how it was used by faculty and staff, and its security requirements.  
Conclusions Related to RQ3 
The third RQ is, To what extent did conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
help GFU IT staff identify and evaluate IS security concerns, including threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks in regard to existing IS assets?  Completing the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment helped GFU IT staff to identify and evaluate security concerns.  
GFU had not previously used a method to identify security threats or to evaluate the IS 
risks to their university.  The risk assessment participants were able to identify risk 
scenarios of which they were previously unaware.  Further, the participants now have a 
more complete understanding of the risks that already had been identified.  The process 
of recording the risks in the Information Asset Risk Worksheets helped the risk 
assessment participants to document the specific aspects of the threat, such as the means 
by which the threat could be carried out, the motive for the attack, and the extent of the 
impact if the threat were realized.  Having a better understanding of the risk scenario 
details is beneficial to deciding how to mitigate the risk.   
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Completing the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment also provided GFU with a 
quantitative relative risk score for each threat, which was calculated using the priorities 
that GFU had identified as business objectives important to their organization.  Along 
with the risk score, OCTAVE Allegro also provided GFU with a qualitative probability 
score associated with each threat to help with risk evaluation and prioritization.  Thus, 
GFU IT staff gained a more complete view of IS threats and has a method for evaluating 
these risks. 
The extent to which the current iteration of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
provided GFU with valuable information, however, was limited, based on the restricted 
timeframe and resources that GFU IT staff were able to dedicate to the risk assessment 
project.  Because GFU lost a couple of IT employees, they were forced to do an abridged 
version of the risk assessment.  Because of the limited time that the participants spent on 
the risk scenario identification phase (Phase 3) of OCTAVE Allegro, the participants did 
not identify or document all the threat scenarios and risks that a complete risk assessment 
would have.  OCTAVE Allegro did provide GFU with a process to identify further 
threats or an evaluation tool for risks.  This will be more useful to GFU as IT staff 
members complete the rest of the Information Asset Risk Worksheets based on 
information regarding the risk assessment that participants have collected in the Threat 
Scenario Questionnaires (OCTAVE Allegro Questionnaires v1.0).   
Conclusions Related to RQ4   
The fourth RQ is, To what extent did the completion of the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment provide adequate information that enabled GFU IT staff to prioritize the 
security measures that should be employed to secure their IS assets?  Before completing 
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the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment, the GFU IT department did not have a 
methodology for justifying to the management the necessity of GFU’s IS security 
operations or a way to objectively set priorities for security-related plans and projects.  
The completion of this abridged OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment provided GFU with a 
relative risk matrix to view the risks to their IS assets and enabled GFU to prioritize 
security plans based on this objective view.  The knowledge gained by the participants by 
conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment, along with the existence of the 
resulting relative risk matrix, provided GFU with an effective method to prioritize IS-
related security measures.   
Due to limited time spent on this iteration of the risk assessment project, however, a 
number of the risks listed in the OCTAVE Allegro worksheets were ones that already had 
been verbally identified by GFU IT staff and for which priorities previously had been 
decided.  Although spending the time to put all threats into the risk matrix would produce 
more robust results, the results of this risk assessment project did provide a way for the 
IT department to justify to upper management the necessity of their current security 
priorities and projects.  The view that GFU has of the risk to their IS assets will become 
more complete and will provide more useful prioritization insights as GFU IT staff 
spends time identifying and evaluating more threat scenarios.  GFU would gain even 
more benefit if IT staff incorporated the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment activities into 
a regular part of their IT responsibilities and include this risk information in management 
reporting, as the GFU IT staff is considering doing. 
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Implications 
Impact on Risk Management Research 
As noted by Bougaardt and Kyobe (2011) and Sanchez et al. (2010), there is a need 
for more research in the area of risk management for small- and medium-sized entities, 
such as post-secondary institutions.  This investigation provides an important step in 
meeting the need for more research focused on IS risk assessments for small colleges and 
universities.  This investigation offers an important finding in regard to risk assessments 
for small colleges and universities in that it has validated the feasibility of using 
OCTAVE Allegro in a small university environment and verified that a small university 
can obtain meaningful results from doing so.   
The results of this investigation demonstrated that the OCTAVE Allegro methodology 
met the unique requirements of small- to medium-sized colleges and universities.  These 
results are significant, as few other studies have validated the use of a particular risk 
assessment method in a small university environment (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2013; 
Beranek, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2010).  As described in the classic reports by Kvavik 
(2006) and Yanosky (2007), and then confirmed in recent reports by Grajek and Arroway 
(2012) and Keating (2012), fewer than half of all smaller institutions of higher education 
perform risk assessments of administrative systems.  According to Sanchez et al. (2010), 
small- to medium-sized colleges and universities typically do not perform risk 
assessments due to a lack of financial resources or IT personnel with adequate computer 
security skills.  Sanchez et al. also noted the need for the development of a risk 
assessment methodology that meets the specific requirements of smaller colleges and 
universities, specifically, a methodology that is easy to understand, provides detailed 
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worksheets, and is cost efficient.  Identifying OCTAVE Allegro as an appropriate risk 
assessment method for small- and medium-sized institutions of higher education may 
help to remove an obstacle for many small colleges and universities as they struggle to 
find an appropriate risk assessment methodology for their environment.   
Further, in recent literature, such as Al-Ahmad and Mohammad (2013) and Talabis 
and Martin (2013), there remains a misunderstanding of the feasibility of using OCTAVE 
Allegro to produce meaningful results in small- and medium-sized organizations.  This 
investigation clearly sets OCTAVE Allegro apart from the two earlier versions of 
OCTAVE (the original OCTAVE Method and OCTAVE-S; Caralli et al., 2007) and 
demonstrates how it can be used successfully at a small university for conducting an 
effective risk assessment.  Because the first two versions of OCTAVE were more 
difficult to use in terms of the amount of time and expertise required (Caralli et al., 2007; 
Talabis & Martin, 2013), it appears that OCTAVE Allegro is often grouped with these 
earlier variants and is, thus, characterized as too difficult to use in a smaller environment.  
According to Al-Ahmad and Mohammad, “Due to the level of activity and overhead 
involved in OCTAVE, it is probably best suited to large organizations or projects” (p. 
34).  Although Al-Ahmad and Mohammad correctly stated that there were three different 
models of OCTAVE, they failed to properly differentiate their requirements or 
characterize appropriate uses for each one (Caralli et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009).  Al-
Ahmad and Mohammad provide a comparison table that characterizes OCTAVE Allegro 
as being inappropriate for small- and medium-sized organizations, needing outside 
consultation to complete, requiring a moderate level of skill, and having a medium cost of 
implementation.  It appears that this characterization of OCTAVE Allegro was 
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incorrectly conceived, as that same table showed the original OCTAVE and OCTAVE-S 
to be low cost, appropriate for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and requiring only a 
simple skill level to complete, characteristics that should have instead been applied to 
OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, this apparent misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation is an example of what continues to appear in literature on OCTAVE 
Allegro.   
Another example of the lack of a clear characterization of OCTAVE Allegro is found 
in Talabis and Martin (2013).  Although Talabis and Martin did a good job of describing 
the OCTAVE Allegro process, they lumped it together with the earlier versions of 
OCTAVE and stated, “The detail level and complexity of the OCTAVE assessment 
approach has made it hard to adopt on a wide scale” (p. 29).  Talabis and Martin also 
stated, “Even if Allegro is the streamlined version of OCTAVE, it is still relatively long 
and complex if followed to the letter when compared to other frameworks” (p. 34).  
However, the other frameworks compared in Talabis and Martin are the Factor Analysis 
of Information Risk (FAIR), NIST’s Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, and 
ISO/IEC 27005, which are known to be highly complex, require extensive resources to 
complete, and are not appropriate for smaller organizations (Beachboard et al., 2008; 
Sanchez et al., 2010).   
Based on the results of this investigation that used OCTAVE Allegro, this author 
would challenge the idea that OCTAVE Allegro is difficult to understand or to use in 
completing a risk assessment, particularly when compared to other risk assessment 
methodologies or frameworks such as FAIR, COBIT, NIST, and ISO/IEC 27005.  The 
author would encourage other studies to evaluate the ease of use and effectiveness of 
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OCTAVE Allegro in small- and medium-sized institutions of higher education and other 
organizations.   
Contributions to Professional Practice 
According to Sanchez et al. (2010), most of the widely accepted risk assessment 
frameworks and methods have been designed with larger organizations in mind.  
Previously, there have not been clearly identified risk assessment methods that will meet 
the unique needs of small- and medium-sized colleges and universities, which need a 
method that does not require a large outlay of finances or require highly experienced 
security personnel (Beachboard et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2010).  The results of this 
investigation have shown that OCTAVE Allegro can provide meaningful risk assessment 
results while meeting the requirements of smaller universities.  Thus, this investigation 
addressed an obstacle that has hindered IT personnel at smaller universities from 
completing a meaningful IS risk assessment.   
This investigation has demonstrated that a meaningful IS risk assessment can be 
conducted by IT staff who are not security experts and who have had no previous training 
in risk management.  OCTAVE Allegro provides a structured risk assessment 
methodology that is easy to understand, can be conducted in a relatively short timeframe, 
and can provide meaningful results.  Even for a small IT department that is aware of their 
existing IS assets, performing an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment provides a structured 
way to document what IS assets are important to the institution, to record their value to 
the institution, to explicitly record how they are used within the university, and to clearly 
identify their security requirements. 
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As presented in the results of this investigation, OCTAVE Allegro provides a cost-
effective way for small universities to use a structured and repeatable method to identify 
and evaluate threats to their IS assets.  The OCTAVE Allegro method gives small- and 
medium-sized colleges and universities access to an objective way to prioritize their 
security-related projects and plan for the most effective way to use limited resources to 
secure their IS assets.   
 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings from this investigation, the author recommends four areas for 
future research related to the topic of risk assessments in institutions of higher education.  
First, the author recommends that future research with the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment include participants who receive more training than was done in this 
investigation.  The OCTAVE Allegro Documentation indicates that the training 
requirements for successfully performing an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment are 
minimal and that participants “should be able to use the guidance and worksheets 
included in this technical report without further instruction” (Caralli et al., 2007, p. 24).  
This case study at GFU took this approach; there was no training, except for participants’ 
reading the specific guidance found in the appendices of the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation.  The OCTAVE Allegro Documentation does suggest, however, that 
participants new to risk assessment should have some sort of training, even if it entails 
spending one or two days reading the entire OCTAVE Allegro Documentation found in 
Caralli et al.   Further, SEI offers an official OCTAVE Training course (SEI Training, 
2013), which the author attended prior to the start of this risk assessment project.  This 
three-day course covers the entire OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment process and 
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includes lectures, in-class exercises that simulate performing a risk assessment, and 
discussions of the different OCTAVE Allegro activities.  The author recommends that 
further research be performed whereby the risk assessment participants receive training 
from the official OCTAVE Training course (SEI Training, 2013) or an equivalent amount 
of training as part of a risk assessment project.  It is anticipated that this additional 
training would improve the quality of the risk assessment conclusions and usefulness for 
risk prioritization.   
Second, because GFU lost a couple of IT personnel at the start of this risk assessment 
investigation, GFU was forced to do an abridged version of the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment.  Based on this time constraint, the threat identification phase (Phase 3) was 
not completed in a manner that identified all security threat scenarios and, thus, provided 
limited benefit when analyzing and prioritizing risks (Phase 4).  The author recommends 
that further investigation be done that would allow adequate time to thoroughly complete 
Phases 3 and 4.  It is anticipated that there would be pronounced benefits from doing a 
more thorough threat identification and risk prioritization.   
Third, IS security industry expert and co-author of the OCTAVE Allegro 
Documentation, Lisa Young, in an email to the author (Appendix F), stated, “the more 
that GFU can make the risk assessment a regular part of the management reporting . . . 
the better the continued identification and assessment of risk will be over time” (para. 4).  
This investigation was not longitudinal; it did not analyze the long-term benefits from 
continued use of OCTAVE Allegro, but such a study at a small- or medium-sized 
institution of higher education could be beneficial in providing insightful research.  There 
would be benefit in knowing whether the long-term use of OCTAVE Allegro would 
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positively affect risk management at a small university in regard to such matters as the 
number and severity of security incidents, the ability to communicate the value of IS 
security projects to upper management, the development of risk priorities, and continued 
use of OCTAVE Allegro as beneficial in regular IT reporting.   
Finally, this investigation focused on the use of OCTAVE Allegro at a small 
university.  According to Keating (2012), 32% of the largest universities still do not 
perform risk assessments on their critical IS assets contained in administrative systems, 
as seen earlier in Table 1.  Although OCTAVE Allegro is well suited to be used at 
smaller institutions, it was not designed to be limited to smaller-sized organizations 
(Caralli et al., 2007).  The difficulty in using one of the more complex risk assessment 
frameworks may be a hindrance to the large universities that have not completed an IS 
risk assessment.  The author recommends that future research validate the effective use of 
OCTAVE Allegro at a large university, the results of which could help to overcome 
further barriers to conducting a risk assessment by the large universities that do not 
currently utilize a risk assessment methodology.   
 
Summary 
This investigation focused on validating an IS risk assessment methodology for a 
small institution of higher education.  Conducting a risk assessment is an important part 
of a comprehensive security management plan for any organization, including for 
colleges and universities (Kouns & Minoli, 2010; Landoll, 2011).  The problem 
addressed in this investigation is the challenge for small colleges and universities of 
finding a risk assessment method that works in their environment.  Many of the currently 
accepted risk assessment methodologies are designed for large organizations (Beranek, 
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2011; Sanchez et al., 2010).  Small institutions of higher education often do not have the 
financial resources and security expertise to conduct these industry-accepted risk 
assessments (Beachboard et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2010).  OCTAVE Allegro is a well-
accepted risk assessment methodology (Liu et al., 2009) that has characteristics that make 
it ideal for use by smaller institutions (Caralli et al., 2007).  The goal of this current 
research was to evaluate the effectiveness of OCTAVE Allegro at a small-sized 
university.   
The research method chosen for this research was a single-case case study, which is 
appropriate when investigating a representative case and there is a need to capture the 
pertinent elements from the context of the organization (Yin, 2009).  The case study was 
carried out at GFU in Newberg, Oregon, a small-sized university of approximately 3,500 
FTE students (GFU, 2013a) and about 20 full-time IT staff members (GFU, 2013b).  The 
unique study by Schuman (2005) included GFU as one of 12 institutions that represented 
a typical small-sized institution of higher education in the U.S. 
There were four research questions addressed in this investigation, as follows.   
RQ1.  To what extent was the OCTAVE Allegro methodology sufficiently 
straightforward for the IT staff at GFU to understand and conduct? 
RQ2.  To what extent did conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment help GFU 
IT staff to identify existing IS assets and classify them in order of importance to the 
mission of the organization? 
RQ3.  To what extent did conducting an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment help GFU 
IT staff to identify and evaluate IS security concerns, including threats, vulnerabilities, 
and risks in regard to existing IS assets? 
98 
 
 
 
RQ4.  To what extent did the completion of a risk assessment using the OCTAVE 
Allegro methodology provide adequate information for GFU IT staff to prioritize the 
security measures that should be employed to secure their IS assets? 
Right before the current risk assessment investigation began, GFU lost two of its top 
IT staff, the CIO and the Director of Administrative Computing (who also operated as 
CISO).  This affected the ability of GFU to dedicate as much time and resources to the 
risk assessment project as had been previously planned.  GFU IT staff were forced to do 
an abbreviated version of the OCTAVE Allegro method in that they identified only a 
representative number of threat scenarios in the threat identification phase (Phase 3) of 
the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment. 
According to Yin (2009), the preferred method to analyze case study evidence is to 
rely on the theoretical propositions that formed the basis of the investigation.  Thus, the 
conclusions drawn from this investigation focus on addressing the four research questions 
that formed the basis of this research.  Based on the outcomes of this investigation, the 
author concluded that the OCTAVE Allegro methodology was sufficiently 
straightforward for the IT staff at GFU to understand and conduct (RQ1).  With no 
background in risk assessment, a network administrator from GFU’s IT department was 
able to spend a couple hours reading the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation that was 
included in the appendices of Caralli et al. (2007) and to begin to conduct an OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment.  The worksheets and guidelines contained in the OCTAVE 
Allegro Documentation provided clear guidance for completing the risk assessment.  A 
review by risk assessment participants of the completed worksheets, provided as 
examples in the OCTAVE Allegro Documentation, clarified most participant questions.   
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Based on an examination of the outcomes of this investigation, the author determined 
that conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment significantly helped GFU IT staff 
to fully understand and document GFU’s IS assets, such as ERP, LMS, and student 
financial data.  During the process of the risk assessment, participants gained an 
increased understanding of who used the IS assets, why the assets were important to the 
university, who the owner of each asset was, and the assets’ security requirements.  In 
this sense, conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment helped GFU IT staff to 
identify existing IS assets and classify them in order of importance to the mission of the 
organization (RQ2).  Although the GFU risk assessment participants were aware of GFU 
data assets and had a good feeling about which were most important, this information 
was not documented, nor was there a complete understanding of all the ways that data 
assets were used or their precise security requirements.  Completing the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment process provided GFU IT staff with a more comprehensive 
understanding of GFU IS assets.    
Based on the outcomes of this investigation, the author further concluded that 
conducting the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment helped GFU IT staff to identify and 
evaluate IS security concerns, including threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in regard to 
existing IS assets (RQ3).  GFU risk assessment participants were able to identify and 
document threats of which they were unaware and were able to build a more complete 
picture of the threats about which they already knew.  Completing the OCTAVE Allegro 
worksheets provided the risk assessment participants with a better understanding of 
specific aspects of each threat scenario, such as the means by which the threat could be 
carried out, the motive for the attack, and the extent of the impact if the threat were 
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realized.  Completion of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment also provided GFU with a 
quantitative relative risk score for each threat, which was calculated based on 
organizational priorities and business drivers identified in Phase 1 of the OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment.  Thus, GFU has a process by which to evaluate the IS security 
risks.  Although the abridged nature of the risk assessment at GFU allowed for only a 
limited number of threat scenarios to be identified, OCTAVE Allegro provided GFU with 
a systematic process to identify further threats and prioritize IS security risks.   
Finally, based on the outcomes of this investigation, the author concluded that the 
completion of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment provided adequate information for 
GFU IT staff to prioritize the security measures that should be employed to secure their 
IS assets (RQ4).  Not having a way to objectively prioritize IS risk was one of GFU IT 
staff’s original concerns.  Using the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment provided GFU 
with a structured and repeatable method for prioritizing more risks as they are identified.  
Whereas the IT staff previously had no way of objectively justifying their IS security 
operations and projects, the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment produced a relative risk 
matrix by which to view all identified risks and prioritize them according to the business 
drivers of the university.  The results helped to validate some of the priorities of GFU’s 
current security projects, which had been based on GFU IT staff intuition.  However, the 
benefits of prioritizing GFU IS risks were limited based on the abridged version of the 
threat identification phase and, thus, provided only a small number of identified risks in 
the relative risk matrix.   
Importantly, this research has implications for risk assessments at small colleges and 
universities.  This investigation identified and validated OCTAVE Allegro as a risk 
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assessment methodology that is appropriate for use at such institutions.  According to 
Sanchez et al. (2010), small- to medium-sized institutions of higher education often do 
not perform risk assessments because of lack of financial resources and IT personnel who 
lack adequate IS security experience.  Sanchez et al. also highlighted the need for the 
development of a risk assessment methodology that would meet the specific requirements 
of smaller organizations, such as the methodology’s being simple and cost efficient.  The 
identification and validation of OCTAVE Allegro as a risk assessment method that meets 
the needs of small universities may encourage more small colleges and universities to 
take on the important task of performing an IS risk assessment. 
Based on the findings from this investigation, the author identified four 
recommendations for future research.  First, the GFU risk assessment participants had 
minimal training before completing the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment project.  The 
author recommends that further research be conducted that would include the risk 
assessment participants’ attending the official SEI OCTAVE Training course (SEI 
Training, 2013) before conducting the risk assessment.  Second, GFU risk assessment 
participants performed an abridged version of the threat identification phase (Phase 3) of 
OCTAVE Allegro, which limited the value of the risk assessment results.  The author 
recommends that future research include a study whereby the participants take the time 
needed to thoroughly complete the threat identification phase.  Third, the author 
recommends a longitudinal study be conducted to investigate the benefits of using 
OCTAVE Allegro as part of continued management reporting, as the author anticipates 
that this would improve the identification and assessment of risk for the university.  
Fourth, this investigation was done at a small university.  The author recommends that 
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future research should study the effectiveness of OCTAVE Allegro at a large university, 
as 32% of large-sized universities do not perform regular IS risk assessments on 
administrative systems (Keating, 2012). 
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Appendix A 
 
GFU Consent to Participate in Research 
 
E-mail from Greg Smith Confirming GFU as Location for Risk Assessment 
From: Greg Smith  
Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2009 1:07 PM 
To: Corland Keating 
Subject: Re: PhD Dissertation Research at GFU 
 
I would like to confirm that George Fox University is looking forward to working with 
Corland on an OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment for various data sets at our university.  
This is the type of project that we have wanted to perform, but making it happen in the 
typical hectic IT schedule is a challenge.  We have a fairly solid security and sys admin 
focus here at GFU but no experience with this specific risk assessment.  My newly 
identified Chief Security Officer, Sean McKay, will also be actively involved. 
‐‐ 
Greg Smith 
Chief Information Officer 
George Fox University 
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Appendix B 
 
Acronyms 
 
CCTA  Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency 
CFO   Chief Financial Officer    
CIO   Chief Information Officer    
CISO   Chief Information Security Officer   
CMU  Carnegie Mellon University 
COBIT  Control Objectives for Information and related Technology  
CRAMM  CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method  
PCI DSS  Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
ECAR  EDUCAUSE Center for Applied Research 
ERA Utility Digital Defense Inc.’s Enterprise Risk Assessment Utility 
ERP  Enterprise Resource Planning  
FAIR  Factor Analysis of Information Risk 
FERPA Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
FISMA  Federal Information Security Management Act   
FRAAP  Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process 
FTE   Full-time equivalent 
GFU   George Fox University 
HIPAA  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act  
IP   Internet Protocol 
IS   Information Systems  
ISO/IEC  International Organization for Standardization/International 
Electrotechnical Commission 
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IT   Information Technology 
LMS  Learning Management System 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology  
OCTAVE  Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
RQ  Research Question 
SEI   Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute 
SP  Special Publication (by NIST) 
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Appendix C 
 
Pre-Risk Assessment Structured Interview Questions 
1) Does GFU have IT staff dedicated to IS security?   
a) If not, who has the responsibility of addressing the IS security concerns at GFU? 
 
2) What is the process for updating GFU’s security policies and procedures? 
 
3) Has GFU conducted an IS risk assessment in the past?   
a) If so, how often does GFU do so?  
b) If so, on which assets were the assessment performed (e.g., IT systems/ 
infrastructure, central administrative systems/data)? 
c) If GFU has conducted a risk assessment in the past, what has been the outcome or 
benefits received? 
 
4) What is the process for determining which security projects get funded?  Or how are 
security concerns prioritized?  
 
5) Does GFU maintain a list of all IS assets, including all data?  What is the process of 
prioritizing them in terms of importance to the mission of GFU? 
 
6) Does GFU maintain documentation as to what systems store and transport which data 
assets?  
 
7) Does GFU perform vulnerability analysis/scans on IT assets?   
a) If so, what methods or tools are used to do so?   
b) If so, who carries out these scans?   
 
8) You mentioned in our initial meeting that you believe you know intuitively where 
your greatest risk currently lies and the area you would want to do a more formal risk 
assessment on (based on the expense of purchasing identity protection for all users). 
What area is that? 
 
9) How does GFU record detected security breaches and incidents?   
a) What kind of action was taken for these past incidents?   
b) What process is in place for handling incidents? 
 
10) Does GFU regularly perform penetration testing or vulnerability scans on their IS 
assets, or perform other actions to capture vulnerabilities (or do threat analysis)?  
What happens with the outcomes of these activities? 
11) What is GFU’s process for calculating IS asset vulnerability and risk? 
107 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Post-Risk Assessment Structured Interview Questions 
1) How straightforward did you find the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to be? (Is it 
understandable? Do you think more training would have benefited you? Any parts 
you found difficult to understand?)   
 
2) How useful did you find the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment to be for identifying 
existing IS assets? (Did it give you a better picture of your assets? What about 
identifying the data owners, or containers, or how they are used?) 
 
3) How useful did you find the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment to be for classifying 
IS assets or rating them in terms of their order of importance to the mission of GFU? 
(Did it highlight or give you insight into their values? Did it change your thinking 
about the importance of any of the assets [either elevating them or lowering them]? 
 
4) How useful did you find the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment to be for identifying 
and evaluating IS security concerns, including threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in 
regard to existing IS assets? (Did it help you identify vulnerabilities or threats that 
you were not previously aware of? Did it help give you a better evaluation of the risks 
to your assets? Do you think you have a better understanding of the risks to your IS 
assets?) 
 
5) How useful did you find the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment to be for providing 
information for IT staff to prioritize the security measures that should be employed to 
secure their IS assets? (Do you have a better understanding of what areas need to be 
worked on to secure? Did this change from when you started the risk assessment? [If 
did not change in that the top ones are the same,] after working on the top couple 
concerns, do you have a better feel for other security measures that need to be 
employed that you were not aware of previously?) 
 
6) Do you have any other comments about the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
process at GFU that you would like to share? 
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Appendix E 
 
Risk Assessment Professionals’ Consent to Participate in Research 
 
E-mail from Lisa Young Confirming Feedback for Risk Assessment  
From: Lisa R. Young  
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 11:02 AM 
To: Corland Keating 
Subject: RE: OCTAVE Allegro Research in Higher Ed 
Attachments: example metrics for the RMM risk management process.docx 
 
Corland, 
 
I would be happy to help.  I have attached a list of process metrics I am using in some of 
my current Resiliency Management Model (RMM) Risk Management work.  If they fit 
into your research you are welcome to use them to validate your results.  For example, if 
someone institutionalized the Allegro method as a part of regular management activities, 
would these be the metrics that would give them an indication of their risk management 
capabilities? Check out www.cert.org/resiliency for more info on RMM. 
 
Regards, Lisa 
 
 
 
 
E-mail from Steffani Burd Confirming Feedback for Risk Assessment  
From: Steffani Burd, Ph.D.  
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 6:06 AM 
To: Corland Keating 
Subject: RE: An Update: OCTAVE Allegro Research in Higher Ed 
 
Dear Corland, 
 
I would be delighted to help you.  Am comfortable with the areas you listed as needing 
input and look forward to being a resource for you - and congratulations on your 
continued progress! Feel free to let your advisor know that I’m delighted to help you with 
this process. 
 
Kind regards and congratulations again on your ongoing progress! 
 
Steffani 
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Email from Kathleen Roberts Confirming Feedback for Risk Assessment  
From: Kathleen Roberts  
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2010 8:19 AM 
To: 'Corland Keating' 
Subject: RE: A Question - OCTAVE Allegro Research in Higher Ed 
 
Corland, 
 
Received your email and apologize for the much delayed response.  4Q09 and 1Q10 have 
been tough both professionally and personally.   
 
All that to say that I am still interested and willing to assist your efforts!  Please provide a 
status of your Idea Paper, an update on your research design method and let me know 
what your dissertation timeline looks like. 
 
Look forward to working together. 
 
Take care, 
Kathleen 
__________________________________ 
Kathleen K. Roberts 
Founder and Principal 
www.isecuresolutions.com 
110 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
Professional Input before Risk Assessment Project 
From: Lisa R. Young  
Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2012 10:03 AM 
To: Corland Keating 
Subject: RE: OCTAVE Allegro Research in Higher Ed—Dissertation Proposal 
Approved 
 
Corland, 
 
Congrats on making progress on your dissertation.  I have read the methodology and it 
follows the constructs laid out for conducting an OCTAVE assessment.   
 
There are a couple of things that may be useful to know about doing an assessment in the 
field.  First, the risk measurement criteria are often the hardest to formulate, even for 
organizations that are experienced in risk management.  Also, from a risk response 
perspective, the more you can make the criteria quantitative rather than qualitative, the 
better you are able to prioritize the identified risks.  For example, try to put thresholds on 
the qualitative criteria like this for Reputation: GFU shows up in the local newspaper in 
an unfavorable light one time in a year—Low; GFU shows up in the local newspaper 6 
times annually in an unfavorable light—Moderate; GFU shows up in the local paper and 
the national news story one time annually in an unfavorable light—High. 
 
You should work with GFU to establish what they believe are their tolerances in each of 
the categories.  One other category that we have added for institutions of higher learning 
is the category of “Teaching time.”  If there were a risk that was realized and it meant 
that the campus facilities or distance learning was not available for X time period, it 
would result in Y impact.  Find out what the range of unavailability is for those types of 
risks at GFU and what types of risk could cause that to happen. 
 
Second, the more that GFU can make the risk assessment a regular part of the 
management reporting, perhaps by leveraging any compliance reporting that management 
has to provide on a regular basis, the better the continued identification and assessment of 
risk will be over time. 
 
I wish you the best. 
 
Lisa 
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Appendix H 
 
Professional Input after Review of Results and Conclusions 
From: Lisa R. Young  
Sent: Monday, September 02, 2013 7:34 AM 
To: Corland Keating 
Subject: RE: Final Input for My Dissertation!  
 
Corland, 
 
Well done!  I read the Introduction, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and skimmed through the rest 
of the paper, including the appendices.  I was glad to see that the folks at GFU were able 
to use the method by reading the workbook materials.  One of the goals of Allegro was to 
make it simple to use but still provide good value for the organization.  To answer your 
questions: 
 
1. Your findings are valid in that they provide GFU a way to more completely and 
holistically understand risks to the organization, not just technology risks.  I was 
particularly glad to see that Participant 1 came to the conclusion that people and 
process are important also.  So, yes, the findings are valid. 
 
2. Yes, the findings are generalizable to other small universities.  I have used the 
Allegro method to assist other small organizations and often the most useful 
outcome is the awareness that comes from understanding how important the 
underlying assets are to the mission of the organization.  All organizations, 
particularly small organizations, need to understand that service/mission delivery 
depends on assets. 
 
I do think the implications are right on and the Allegro method does get conflated with 
the other OCTAVE methods.   
 
Thank you again for letting me be a part of your journey. 
Regards, Lisa 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
From: Corland Keating  
Sent: Saturday, August 31, 2013 5:37 PM 
To: Lisa R. Young 
Subject: FW: Final Input for My Dissertation!  
…  
The two questions that I really need input on are: 
1) If my findings are valid (as a risk assessment), and 
2) If the OCTAVE Allegro method (according to the results I found at GFU) would be 
applicable to (generalizable to/useful at) other small universities. 
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